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The	Federal	Open	Market	Committee	 (FOMC)	 judges	 that	 inflation	at	
the	rate	of	2	percent	…	is	most	consistent	over	the	longer	run	with	the	
Federal	 Reserve’s	 mandate	 for	 price	 stability	 and	 maximum	
employment.	 Over	 time,	 a	 higher	 inflation	 rate	 would	 reduce	 the	
public’s	ability	 to	make	accurate	 longer‐term	economic	and	 financial	
decisions.	On	the	other	hand,	a	lower	inflation	rate	would	be	associated	
with	 an	 elevated	 probability	 of	 falling	 into	 deflation,	 which	 means	
prices	 and	 perhaps	 wages,	 on	 average,	 are	 falling—a	 phenomenon	
associated	with	very	weak	economic	conditions.	Having	at	least	a	small	
level	of	 inflation	makes	 it	 less	 likely	that	the	economy	will	experience	
harmful	 deflation	 if	 economic	 conditions	 weaken.	 The	 FOMC	





Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2010) state that observed inflation targets around the 
industrial world are concentrated at two percent per year and investigate the 
extent to which the observed magnitudes of inflation targets are consistent with 
the optimal rate of inflation predicted by leading theories of monetary non-
neutrality.  
They find that consistently those theories imply that the optimal rate of inflation 
ranges from minus the real rate of interest to numbers insignificantly above zero. 
Furthermore, they argue that the zero bound on nominal interest rates does not 
represent an impediment for setting inflation targets near or below zero. 
They address the question of whether observed inflation targets around the world, 
ranging from two percent in developed countries to three and a half percent in 
developing countries, can be justified on welfare-theoretic grounds, showing that 
the two leading sources of monetary non-neutrality in modern models of the 




adjustment—jointly predict optimal inflation targets of, at most, zero percent per 
year. 
They show that additional reasons frequently put forward in explaining the 
desirability of inflation targets of the magnitude observed in the real world—
incomplete taxation, zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, downward 
rigidity in nominal wages, and quality bias in measured inflation—are shown to 
deliver optimal rates of inflation insignificantly above zero. 
In this Ph.D. thesis we investigate the long-run relationship between inflation, 
economic growth, labor market variables and financial variables in order to find 
the costs associated with different trend inflation targets adopted by central banks. 
The conclusions are coincident with the previously quoted valuations of Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2010). 
 
Some	precedents	
The first notion about an optimal inflation rate was the Friedman Rule (Friedman, 
1969). As money paid no interest, the optimal policy called for setting nominal 
interest rates on bonds equal to zero. As the nominal interest rate equals the real 
interest rate plus expected inflation, to set the nominal interest rate to zero implies 
that the inflation rate must equal minus the real interest rate. This would involve 
reducing the nominal quantity of money, but this would fall at a slower rate than 
the price level, and the quantity of real balances would increase. Models of growth 




Recent models of endogenous growth, such as Amano et al. (2009), revitalized the 
interest in the negative optimal inflation rate, but in this case it would be equal to 
minus the long-run growth rate in a context compatible with a cashless economy. 
In contrast to these proposals, Krugman (2014) and a number of respected 
macroeconomists, most notably Blanchard (2010) and Ball (2013), have argued for 
a sharply higher target for the inflation rate, say 4 percent, based on the argument 
of the perils of the zero lower bound. 
However, Coibion, Gorodnichenko and Wieland (2012) derive the utility-based 
welfare loss function taking into account the effects of positive steady-state 
inflation, and solve for the optimal level of inflation in the model for plausible 
calibrations, finding large welfare gains and a very low optimal inflation rate 
consistent with price stability. Their results suggest that raising the inflation target 
is too blunt an instrument to efficiently reduce the severe costs of zero-bound 
episodes that can be interpreted as supporting the current regimes, while 
providing little evidence in favor of raising these targets against the zero-bound 
constraint on interest rates. 
 
The	reasons	for	a	positive	inflation	rate	target	
The reasons for a positive inflation target are very well presented in Billi and Kahn 
(2008) who, after recognizing that inflation nowadays is low in many countries, 
think that the question of what inflation rate to aim for is central and that most 
policymakers agree that they should not allow inflation to fall below zero because 
the costs of deflation are thought to be high. But they add that both policymakers 




banks should aim to keep inflation. One reason for keeping inflation above zero 
stems from the fact that nominal interest rates cannot fall below zero. And a very 
low-inflation environment limits the extent to which policymakers can respond to 
an economic slowdown. Once short-term rates fall to zero, conventional monetary 
policy tools no longer work to stimulate economic activity. 
Knowing what inflation rate to aim for is also critically important because many 
central banks have adopted formal numerical inflation objectives over the last few 
decades. Setting an appropriate target for inflation requires understanding how 
alternative inflation objectives impact economic stability and overall economic 
well-being. Ideally, policymakers should aim for an inflation rate that maximizes 
the economic well-being of the public, but Billi and Kahn (2008) think that 
rigorous estimates of such an “optimal inflation rate” have not been available in 
economics literature. 
There is widespread agreement among the public, economists and policymakers 
that inflation is bad for the economy. As a result, in recent decades, central banks 
have adopted policies first to fight inflation and then to keep inflation low. But, for 
a number of reasons, inflation can be too low. Accordingly, while policymakers 
want to keep inflation low, they have not typically aimed for zero inflation. In fact, 
the target is around 2%. 
Inflation is costly. When it is unanticipated, it arbitrarily benefits debtors and hurts 
creditors by decreasing the nominal value of outstanding debt. It discourages 
saving and investment by creating uncertainty about future prices. And, it forces 
businesses and individuals to spend time and resources predicting future prices 




Inflation is also costly even when it is fully anticipated. Through its interaction 
with the tax system, it can increase tax burdens by artificially raising incomes and 
profits. In addition, inflation causes firms to incur costs of changing prices. And, to 
the extent firms only infrequently change prices, inflation can distort relative 
prices and undermine the efficiency of the market’s pricing mechanism. Finally, 
inflation causes individuals to hold less cash and make more trips to the bank 
because inflation lowers the relative value of money holdings. All of these factors 
cause the economy to operate less efficiently, hampering economic growth and 
ultimately reducing standards of living. As a result, policymakers want to keep 
inflation low. 
Although inflation is costly, for a number of reasons, inflation can be too low. First, 
available measures of inflation are imperfect and tend to overstate “true” inflation.	
Measurement errors of the available adjustments for improvement in the quality of 
goods and services are inadequate: there are difficulties in incorporating new 
goods into the indexes, consumer willingness to substitute cheaper goods and 
services for similar products that have seen price increases, and changes in 
consumers’ shopping patterns that may favor discount retailers. For all these 
reasons measures of inflation are imperfect and tend to be biased upward. A 
measured inflation rate of 0 percent would not correspond to price stability, but 
rather would imply a decline in the price level over time. Recent estimates suggest 
price stability would be associated with an inflation rate of just under 1 percent 
per year, more precisely between 0.4 and 0.6 percent per year. 
Second, a little inflation may make it easier for firms to reduce real wages when 




Third, a negative inflation rate deflation could be even more costly than a similar 
rate of inflation, suggesting that a low rate of inflation might be desirable to insure 
against falling prices because the cost of deflation is particularly severe compared 
to inflation. A positive rate of inflation may reduce the risk of the economy ever 
experiencing deflation and its consequences. Finally, at very low levels of inflation, 
nominal interest rates may be close to zero, limiting a central bank’s ability to ease 
policy in response to economic weakness.   
 
The	contribution	of	the	Ph.D.	Thesis	
The issue tackled in this thesis is the long-run relationship inflation/growth in 
neo-Keynesian DSGE models with endogenous growth, considering the coherence 
of the inflation targets of the central banks. 
The results obtained are related to the type of wage considered, the existence of 
frictions in labor and credit markets and the empirical implications for six 
advanced countries. They can be summarized in the following four points:  
 The consideration of the wage per unit of labor (per worker or per 
hour) is the reason for obtaining negative optimal trend inflation, 
while that inflation is zero with wage per unit of human capital. Both 
results come from a dynamic mechanism that reaches a situation 
which is equivalent to wage flexibility. 
 The same results on optimal inflation are confirmed once 
unemployment is introduced in the models and it is found an 




run which generalizes the usual version of the mainstream 
macroeconomic models. 
The extension maintains the inflation/unemployment independence 
(natural rate), adding a protagonist role of employment and labor 
force participation rates, that are maximal for the optimal inflation 
rate.  
The inflation rate value that coincides with the natural unemployment 
rate is not indifferent, as in Friedman’s critique, because it can be 
accompanied by different growth, employment and labor force 
participation rates.  
 The frictions of the financial sector confirm the same results on the 
optimal trend inflation and not always have a negative impact on the 
achievable economic growth because it depends on the type of friction.  
Finally, the empirical application explores in what extent the six 
considered countries could improve their growth, employment and 
labor  force participation rates according to the obtained  
inflation/growth relationship in every case.  The growth gain, after 
adjusting their inflation targets, would come for the USA, Australia and 
Spain from an increase of the employment and labor force 
participation rates, while in the case of Japan, France y Germany it 
would come from a productivity increase.   
 






Chapter	 1:	 Optimal	 trend	 inflation,	 nominal	 rigidities	 and	 human	 capital	
growth		
The current value for the inflation rate target set by many central banks—around 
2% in advanced economies— is not currently being reached and the reaction has 
been the adoption of unconventional measures in order to address the problem 
posed by the zero lower bound and the menace of deflation. At the same time, 
there is a great concern about the simultaneous generalization of low growth rates 
in the advanced economies, which has led once again to discussion about the 
phenomenon of “secular stagnation.”  Consequently, the current concerns about 
trend inflation and long-run growth has brought to the fore the high value that a 
well-established relationship between them would have, in order to shed light on 
the management of these two very important variables. 
A point of high concern for central banks is to what extent the existence of a well-
established relationship between trend inflation and long-run growth could help in 
the assessment of monetary policy decisions in setting the inflation rate target. 
When rigidities, especially in wages, are considered in endogenous growth 
contexts, non-neutrality is an immediate result in the long run, as an incipient 
research line has shown. As the stability of a given currency is linked to the 
credibility of the inflation rate target, this rate can be considered as the trend 
inflation and a well-established relationship with the long-run growth could help 
in the choice of the target.  
Taking into consideration this economic context and the quoted precedents, 




of this chapter is to know whether the optimal trend inflation rate around -2% to -
3% can be generalized for any engine of endogenous growth with sticky prices and 
wages. In order to answer this question, we have considered four different 
endogenous growth models: Schumpeterian technological change, as in Aghion 
and Howitt (1992); physical capital externality, as in Romer (1986); technological 
change, as in Romer (1990); and human capital, as in Lucas (1988).  
After analyzing the impact of price and wage rigidities on the long-run growth rate 
in the four models, we can conclude that the optimal trend inflation rate is not 
always negative. Firstly because, with only price rigidity, the long-run relationship 
between inflation and growth is not relevant, at least for admissible values of 
quarterly inflation or deflation rates, so the neutrality of trend inflation is the 
conclusion in this case, regardless of growth engines. Secondly, this result cannot 
be generalized either when we consider sticky wages, since the model based on 
human capital accumulation reaches the maximum growth rate for a null inflation. 
While the annual objective inflation rate is within the interval between -2% and -
3% when we consider stickiness in nominal wage per hour (Schumpeterian, 
physical capital and technological change models), we find that the model of 
human capital reaches its maximum growth for a null inflation rate as a 
consequence of its stickiness in nominal wage-per-unit of  human capital. 
What is the cause of this difference? It lies in the fact that, in the first group of 
models with wages per hour or worker, the wage-setting process must adjust the 
nominal value in order to compensate inflation and growth. Consequently, a 
negative trend inflation rate with an absolute value equal to the long-run growth 




were wage and price flexibility. The long-run real wage that individuals receive 
will grow at the same rate as with flexibility, thanks to the falling trend of prices. 
However, the wage-setting process in the human capital model must not 
compensate the effect of growth because wages respond without lag to the human 
capital accumulation process carried out by individuals. That is, wage rigidity does 
not affect the productivity component of labor contracts, only the wage-per-unit of 
human capital because wage contracts consider the skill aspects separately and 
revise them with flexibility. Then, as nominal wages grow in the long run at the 
rate of trend inflation, the compensation for inflation is sufficient to recover the 
equilibrium real value of the wage-per-unit of human capital. Then the maximum 
growth rate is reached with null trend inflation in a situation that is also equivalent 
to flexibility. The long-run real wage that individuals receive will grow, thanks to 
long-run human capital accumulation.  
On the basis of the above analysis, we identify that the ultimate reason behind 
negative or null optimal trend inflation is the attainment of a situation that is 
equivalent to wage flexibility, with the result depending on the type of wage unit 
considered in the wage settlements. This finding is a clear contribution to showing 
the mechanism that clarifies the meaning and the costs of nominal wage rigidities 
in the long-run when the inflation target set by central banks is not the optimal 
one.  
An additional and outstanding aspect of the models with wages per hour is that 
trend inflation has a very small effect on long-run growth. However, the results of 
the human capital model show a much more important non-neutrality 




but also the effort devoted to human capital accumulation and, hence, the growth 
rate. This result suggests the convenience of taking into account the role played by 
human capital (or job skill) when studying the influence of wage rigidity on growth 
in the long run. All the previous studies have considered the influence of nominal 
rigidities on wages per hour, ignoring the important role played by human capital 
in the wage-setting process. 
Chapter	 2:	 Labor	 force	 participation	 and	 growth	 in	 the	 long	 run:	 a	 New‐
Keynesian	extension	of	Friedman’s	Phillips	curve	revision	
Through the second chapter we will continue studying the relationship between 
trend inflation and long-run economic growth, but integrating new variables that 
provide a more general perspective, which, except for a few rare exceptions, are 
not usually considered in macroeconomic models. Specifically, we analyze what is 
the impact on the quoted results in Chapter 1 of considering that labor supply is no 
longer equal to labor demand and, therefore, unemployment appears in the 
economy. The objective is to know how a distortion in the labor market, which 
leads to unemployment, affects the value obtained for the optimal trend inflation. 
The results of this chapter come to confirm Friedman’s criticism of the Phillips 
curve in the long run in 1967, introducing some additional endogenous labor 
variables and a distortion in the labor market. We consider as endogenous variable 
not only employment, but also unemployment and labor force participation. This 
shift in the focus provides important and apparently groundbreaking conclusions, 
given the more general perspective that it is able to provide for the 
macroeconomic dynamics. A first result confirms the irrelevance of unemployment 




by the employment and labor force participation rates. In fact, we can confirm by 
means of simulations using Dynare that the optimal trend inflation rate is 
independent of the unemployment rate but, by contrast, it maximizes 
simultaneously employment and labor force participation rates. 
These results contain significant promise, beyond the confirmation of Friedman’s 
hypothesis of the independence between trend inflation and unemployment in the 
long run, because it seems that they could represent a relevant New-Keynesian 
extension of Friedman’s Phillips curve critique. Effectively, the constant long-run 
unemployment rate is compatible with many values of the labor force participation 
and employment rates, two variables with a great factual economic impact but 
with hardly any presence in theoretical macroeconomic analysis. In our results, 
they appear as two key labor market variables in the relationship between trend 
inflation and long-run growth, from the perspective of the monetary policy 
summarized by the trend inflation rate as the inflation target and, therefore, the 
possibilities of monetary policy to affect it. 
Moreover, the new labor market context (efficiency wages) has relevant additional 
consequences. While unemployment rate with wage stickiness is higher than that 
of flexibility in the Schumpeterian model, we find the opposite in the human 
capital model. But the more remarkable result is that a sticky average real wage 
can be higher, equal or lower than a flexible one and, unlike chapter 1, the value of 
the achievable growth rate will be respectively lower, equal or higher with wage 
stickiness than with wage flexibility. Consequently, the unemployment caused by 
the labor market distortion introduced can lead to a “growth loss” or a “growth 




and labor force participation rates. Nevertheless, from all these possibilities, the 
more likely combinations of efficiency wage parameters in the two models are 
those leading to a “growth loss.” 
Chapter	3:	Financial	 frictions,	unemployment	and	 long‐run	 inflation−growth	
relationship:	empirical	implications	
Throughout Chapter 3 we complete our analysis with the introduction of a 
financial sector. We can find different precedents in the existing literature on the 
link between financial system and long-run economic growth, where we are 
interested in the long-run relationship between leverage ratio and growth. The 
results in the literature to date appear conclusive in that there is not a relation 
generally applicable to all the possible situations. According to the literature, there 
is not a unique relation between the leverage ratio and the growth rate, with any 
direction of causality and even the absence of causality being possible when the 
sample pools cross-country and time series data. 
The first objective of this chapter is to know how a distortion in the financial 
market impacts on the quoted conclusions of the two previous chapters, taking 
into consideration that monetary policy is closely related to interest rates and, 
hence, to financial activity. The results obtained from this analysis allow us to 
confirm that the incorporation of financial frictions has not impact on the main 
results from chapters 1 and 2. On the other hand, the consequences of introducing 
financial frictions cannot be generalized regardless of the friction type, since we 
have found that the costly verification model has no impact on the long-run 
inflation−growth relationship if we consider nominal wage stickiness, unlike 




conclusive influence of the leverage ratio on the growth rate given that, in the two 
considered models of financial frictions, the behavior of the relation between the 
two variables is contrary once trend inflation is considered. 
Our approach involves intermediate goods producers’ or retailers’ need for 
external resources to fund their R&D activity or working capital, respectively, 
because their internal funds are no longer enough. But in addition to that, we will 
consider the existence of asymmetric information in the financial market: 
asymmetric information in favor of financial entities in the Schumpeterian model, 
financial	 intermediation	 model	 according to Gertler and Karadi (2011), and 
asymmetric information in favor of borrowers in the Lucas human capital model, 
costly	verification	according to	Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) and Gertler 
(2009). 
The second objective of this third chapter is to explore the empirical implications 
of the models for six developed countries governed by different central banks 
(United States, Australia, Japan and European Monetary Union countries –EMU- 
France, Spain and Germany) in order to conclude to what extent they could 
improve their long-run growth, employment and labor force participation rates. 
The conclusions from the Schumpeterian model are that the two countries with 
more potential increase in long-run growth are Japan and Germany. The USA and 
France are situated at an intermediate level of improvement, while Australia and 
Spain are the two countries with the lowest level of growth gain. In the Lucas 
human capital model, France is added to the first group, Australia and Spain would 




The way to achieve these gains would be a change in trend inflation (inflation 
target). The single country with a quarterly positive change is Japan (+0.21%), 
while the rest of the countries should decrease the quarterly target by at least -
0.27% Germany, -0.36% France, -0.76% Spain, and -0.88% the USA and Australia. 
For these last two countries the gain in the employment and labor force 
participation (LFP) rates would be, at most, one percentage point, three quarters 
of a percentage point in Spain and near zero in Japan, Germany and France. So, the 
growth gain in the first three countries would come from the improvement in the 
LFP rate, while in the case of the last three it would come from a change in the 
allocation of resources leading to an increase in total factor productivity (TFP) 
growth. In other words, the growth gain would come from the increase in the TFP 
growth in the second group while in the first one the growth gain would come 
from the LFP rate. 
The	desirability	of	low	inflation	rate	target	
As a consequence of the foregoing considerations, although certain economic 
vicissitudes may have led to the justification of high inflation targets, under the 
current economic environment and from a theoretical point of view, the decisions 
of monetary policy should not only avoid increasing the target, but they should be 
aimed at reducing it.  
The results of this thesis provide substantial grounds to conclude the suitability of 
a low rate target of near zero in terms of economic growth and welfare. According 
to the contribution of this thesis, and following authors such as Schmitt-Grohe and 




the target represent an opportunity cost not only in terms of economic growth and 











A wage-setting process defined in terms of wage per hour is the key factor for obtaining 
negative optimal trend inflation in a closed economy. However, this inflation will be zero 
if the process is established on the wage-per-unit of human capital. The origin of both 
results is a dynamic mechanism that, with some differences, makes possible the 
attainment of a situation equivalent to wage flexibility. Finally, while the effect of trend 
inflation on the long-run growth rate is tiny in the first case, it is much greater in the 





After the Great Recession, central banks have assumed a leading role to revitalize 
credit, consumption and growth in many economies, especially in the advanced 
ones. This role focuses interest on the consequences of their monetary policy 
decisions, not only in the short but also in the long run. Given that the current 
monetary policy is relatively new, these consequences, especially those related to 
the long run, are not well known.  
Among these consequences, a point of high concern is to what extent the existence 
of a well-established relationship between trend inflation and long-run growth 
could help in the assessment of monetary policy decisions. When rigidities, 
                                                        
 
1 An article with the results of this chapter was accepted in April 2018 by Macroeconomic	Dynamics 




especially in wages, are considered in endogenous growth contexts, the non-
neutrality of this monetary policy is an immediate result in the long run, as an 
incipient research line has shown. As the stability of a given currency is linked to 
the credibility of the inflation rate target, this rate can be considered as the trend 
inflation, and a well-established relationship with the long-run growth could help 
in the choice of the target. 
There exists a vast literature on the optimal inflation rate that has been revitalized 
recently as a consequence of the limitations posed by the zero lower bound of the 
interest rate to the monetary policy. As a consequence, the suggestion of increasing 
the target to separate it from zero has emerged (Krugman, 2014). Although it has 
received some support, the proposal has been predominantly contested from the 
academic world because the results on the optimal inflation rate point to values 
around zero or even clearly negative. 
The question to pose, then, is what would be the explanation for the very common 
2% target value of many central banks? A complete set of reasons has been offered 
to support this value and the non-consideration of its increase. But this is not a 
central question of interest in this chapter. The fact is that this value has not been 
reached for a long time and the reaction has been the adoption of unconventional 
measures in order to address the problem posed by the zero lower bound and the 
menace of deflation. At the same time, there is great concern about the 
simultaneous generalization of low growth rates in the advanced economies that 
has led to the reopening of the discussion about the phenomenon of “secular 
stagnation.”  As can be seen, the current concerns about trend inflation and long-




between the two would have, in order to shed light on the management of these 
very important couple of variables. 
Research regarding this relationship requires economic models that connect their 
short and long-term interactions from the most convenient perspective. Ignoring 
these interactions might be causing a misunderstanding of interesting aspects of 
macroeconomic behavior. Dynamic stochastic equilibrium models (DSGE) used for 
the analysis of monetary policy have, until recently, avoided the introduction of 
trend inflation and long-run growth and, consequently, their implications are still 
not well known. The long-run implications of trend inflation have been studied by 
Ascari (2004), Hornstein and Wolman (2005), Kiley (2007), Levin and Yun (2007), 
Amano, Ambler and Rebei (2007), Ascari and Ropele (2007), and Coibion and 
Gorodnichenko (2011), while the study of the interactions of long-run growth and 
monetary policy have been initiated by Amano et al. (2009), Coibion, 
Gorodnichenko and Wieland (2012), and Amano, Carter and Moran (2012), partly 
as a consequence of the introduction of trend inflation into DSGE models. 
Amano et al. (2009) and Coibion, Gorodnichenko and Wieland (2012) provide 
clear conclusions that show the steady optimal inflation rate is negative with 
nominal wage rigidity. But these two works have a clear limitation. They assume 
an exogenous growth rate and conclude the optimal inflation rate from simulations 
with price and wage rigidities. This assumption of growth exogeneity would be 
admissible provided monetary policy is neutral in the long run, or even if its non-
neutrality were quantitatively insignificant as some models seem to point out. But 
things are very different if alternative models are able to suggest a significant 




Carter and Moran (2012) extended the conclusion to the endogenous growth 
context and confirmed the result in a model of technological change, as suggested 
by Romer (1990). 
The main conclusion of Amano et al. (2009) and Amano, Carter and Moran (2012) 
is that the value of the trend inflation rate that maximizes welfare and the log-run 
growth rate is clearly negative (respectively, -1.8% and -3%). From the 
endogenous growth point of view, this is a result requiring confirmation because it 
has been obtained through the introduction of a particular type of growth engine, 
technological change as in Romer (1990), into a DSGE model with trend inflation 
and wage and price rigidities with Taylor contracts.  
Throughout this paper we analyze whether this result, the maximization of the 
long-run growth rate for a negative long-run inflation rate of around 2%−3%, can 
be generalized to any other engine of growth with sticky prices and wages. In 
order to answer this question, we introduce alternative growth engines into the 
same framework of Amano et al. (2009), Coibion, Gorodnichenko and Wieland 
(2012) and Amano, Carter and Moran (2012). Specifically, we will introduce four 
different growth engines: physical capital externality as in Romer (1986); 
Schumpeterian technological change according to Aghion and Howitt (1992); 
technological change in Romer’s model (1990) (reformulating the version 
presented by Amano, Carter and Moran (2012)) and human capital as in Lucas 
(1988). The steady-state properties of these models will be developed to proceed 
subsequently to their calibration and simulation in order to replicate the type of 
results required to answer the question posed. The calibration and simulation of 




After analyzing the impact of price and wage rigidities on the long-run growth rate, 
we can conclude that the trend inflation rate that makes the long-run growth 
maximum is not always negative. The conclusion of Amano et al. (2009) and 
Amano, Carter and Moran (2012) cannot be generalized. Firstly, because with only 
price rigidity the long-run relationship between inflation and growth is not 
relevant, at least for admissible values of inflation or deflation, so the neutrality of 
trend inflation in this case is the conclusion for the four growth engines. 
But, if we consider sticky wages, this result cannot be generalized either.  While 
three models confirm a result similar to the one obtained in Amano et al. (2009) 
and Amano, Carter y Moran (2012), the model based on human capital 
accumulation reaches the maximum growth rate for a null inflation. That is, the 
inflation rate that maximizes the growth rate is within the interval [-1,5% to -3%] 
when we consider sticky wages in models with physical capital externality, as in 
Romer (1986), Schumpeterian growth as in Aghion and Howitt (1992) or 
technological change as in Romer (1990). But this result is not general since we 
find a growth engine that reaches its maximum growth for a null inflation, which 
corresponds to the model of human capital based on Lucas (1988). 
What is the cause of this difference? It lies in the fact that in the first three models 
the wage-setting process must adjust the nominal value in order to compensate 
inflation and growth. A negative trend inflation rate with absolute value equal to 
long-run growth rate makes a nominal modification unnecessary, and the situation 
would be as if there were wage and price flexibility. As a consequence, the 
maximum growth is the same as in the case of flexibility. Any deviation of the trend 




lower growth rate because it has the effect of a negative shock of productivity. In 
this way the decrease in prices implied by the optimal trend inflation value avoids 
the negative distortion on growth introduced by wage stickiness.  The long-run 
real wage individuals receive will grow as with flexibility, thanks to the falling 
trend of prices.  
Wage setting in the human capital model does must not compensate the effect of 
growth because wages respond without lag to the human capital accumulation 
process carried out by the individuals. Then the compensation of the inflation is 
sufficient to recover the equilibrium real value of the wage-per-unit of human 
capital. Given the distortion inflation introduces with price and wage rigidity, 
growth is maximum with null trend inflation. The long-term real wage individuals 
receive will grow thanks to long-term human capital accumulation.  
An additional and outstanding aspect of the first three models is that trend 
inflation has a very small effect on growth in steady state. But, once again, the 
model of human capital is the exception in the quantitative importance of the 
effect. This is the model whose results indicate an important non-neutrality 
phenomenon. 
This result indicates the convenience of taking into account separately the 
evolution of the dynamic of human capital or labour skill when studying the 
influence of wage rigidity on growth in the long run. All the previous studies have 
considered the influence of nominal rigidities in wages per unit of labour. In the 
case of the human capital model, the effect of nominal rigidity in the wage-per-unit 
of human capital is studied. In this case, the nominal evolution of the wage-per-




growth rate of the economy.  In steady state the real wage-per-unit of human 
capital must be constant without taking into account the growth of the economy.  
Before proceeding with the rest of the chapter, we must emphasize that we are 
only going to talk about growth to identify the optimal trend inflation, although the 
ultimate goal of the individuals is welfare maximization. The reason for this is that, 
given our interest in the steady state, talking in terms of growth is equivalent to 
talking in terms of utility, as in Gomme (1993) and Amano, Carter and Moran 
(2012).   
Section 2 contains the presentation of the four models and concludes with the 
steady-state systems of equations that are systematically collected in Appendix 
A.2.  Section 3 analyzes the effects of nominal rigidities on growth rate. Section 4 
summarizes the main impacts described in Section 3 and makes a comparison 
between the behavior of the different models. The transmission mechanisms of the 
models and some outstanding results are interpreted in Section 5. Finally, Section 
6 summarizes the main findings.  
 
 DSGE	models	with	 endogenous	 growth	 and	 staggered	wage	
and	price	setting	
Four growth engines are analyzed in this paper: physical capital externality as in 
Romer (1986); Schumpeterian technological change, according to Aghion and 
Howitt (1992); the type of technological change introduced by Romer (1990); and 
human capital as characterized in Lucas (1988). 




first is the model used by Amano, Carter and Moran (2012); however, we will 
develop it in greater detail in order to be able to analyze more thoroughly the 
impact of nominal rigidities on growth. 
Human capital accumulation raises the productivity of both labour and physical 
capital. The basic idea of this model is that people divide their time between work 
and training. So there is a trade-off, since when taking part in training people do 
not receive  work income, but their future productivity will increase and, 
consequently, their future wages. It is a question of postponing income today (and 
hence consumption) for income tomorrow. 
The elements of the four models will be presented throughout this section. Firstly, 
the behavior of the main agents in the economy will be described. Secondly, the 
source of growth will be explained in greater detail. Hereafter, we will obtain the 
mechanisms of price and wage setting. Finally, we will conclude with the system of 
equations that characterizes the steady state in each model. 
The assumption is made that there is no money, following the “cashless economy” 
hypothesis (Woodford, 2003; Galí, 2008) typically adopted in New-Keynesian 




Household members offer labor to intermediate or final goods producers 
depending on the model, consume the final goods and hold bonds.	Households are 




continuum [0, 1]. 	
Their expected utility takes the form: 
Eo ∑ 𝛽 log 𝐶 𝐿 𝑑𝑠   (1.1) 
where β ∈  0,1  is the utility discount factor, 𝜈 >0) the disutility of the labor 
parameter, C is consumption, 𝐿  represents the supply of labor service s with s ∈
0,1  and 𝐿  𝐿  𝑑𝑠  the composite supply of labor services, and 𝜎 
being the elasticity of substitution. 
Furthermore, households must satisfy their budget constraint, which prevents the 
present value of the expenditure exceeding the income and the value of their 
initial assets. 









𝐿 𝑑𝑠 (1.2.a) 
while the only difference in the budget constraints for the Schumpeterian and 










𝐿 𝑑𝑠 (1.2.b) 
and that corresponding to the human capital model differs by including the 














The variables that define these budgets constraints are the following: 𝐵 , the 
nominal value of the stock of one-period life bonds that households hold in their 
portfolios; 𝑅 , the nominal gross interest rate; Rt the real gross interest rate;  𝑊 , 
the nominal wage for labor service s; Dt, firms’ dividends; 𝐶 , consumption; 𝑅&𝐷 , 
investment in “research and development” (R&D); and Kt	 the stock of capital 
owned by the household.  
Moreover, we must consider the following restriction to avoid Ponzi schemes 
(Galí, 2008), in the four models: 
lim
 → 
𝐸 𝐵 0 (1.3) 
Regarding the human capital model, as in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 
(2005), the representative household holds a stock of physical capital, rents it to 
the intermediate goods producers, and decides how much physical capital to 
accumulate. For simplicity, it is assumed in this model that there are no adjustment 
costs of investment. Then, the law of motion of physical capital is given as follows: 
   𝐾 1 𝛿 𝐾 𝐼  (1.4) 
where 𝛿 represents a depreciation rate of physical capital and 𝐼  gross investment. 
In addition, human capital requires a special mention related to the effective 
supply of every labor service s. Individuals are supposed to make two decisions. 
First, each individual chooses the total time devoted to non-leisure activities, that 
is, production activity plus accumulation of human capital, 𝑁 . Second, each 
household member also chooses the fraction of every time unit that will be 




human capital accumulation, 1 𝑢 . Therefore, the effective labor supply is 
defined as follows: 
  𝐿 𝑢 𝑁 ℎ  (1.5) 
It is assumed that human capital accumulation has the following technology 
 ℎ 1 𝜉 1 𝑢 𝑁 ℎ  (1.6) 
where 𝜉 is a productivity parameter of the accumulation process. The law of 
motion for the economy’s total human capital is then given by: 
  ℎ ℎ 𝑑𝑖 1 𝜉 1 𝑢 𝑁
ℎ
ℎ
𝑑𝑠 ℎ  (1.7) 
Capital	goods	producers	
Capital goods producers are agents present only in the physical capital externality 
model. In this model, capital stock is accumulated through the investment process 
subject to the adjustment costs function. The main relationships of the capital 
accumulation process in this model are: 
𝐾 𝐾 𝐼  (1.8) 











where 𝐼  and 𝐼  are net and gross investment at t, respectively, and 𝑓  is the 




used capital into new capital and resell it to the intermediate goods producers, 
along with the newly created capital. Unlike net investment, refurbished capital 
does not entail adjustment costs. 
The capital producers will determine the capital price Qt that maximizes the value 
of their net investment. So the investment decision problem, which is common to 
all capital producers, is the following: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝐸  𝛽 𝑄 𝐼 𝐼 𝑓
𝐼
𝐾
𝐼  (1.11) 





















where 𝜍 0,   is steady-state net investment−capital ratio and 𝑓  = 𝑓´  = 
0. Consequently, 𝑄 is 1 in steady state. 
Intermediate	goods	firms	
There are two possible types of model, depending on the behavior of the 
intermediate goods firms. In the first type intermediate goods firms have the 
same technology as the final good, while in the second intermediate goods are 




includes the Schumpeterian and technological change models and the second the 
model with physical capital externality and the human capital model. 
Schumpeterian and technological change models 
Under the Schumpeterian and technological change models, monopolistically 
competitive firms obtain intermediate goods. This sector operates a simple 
technology that generates one unit of a given intermediate good from one unit of 
final output. They sell their goods to final goods firms and set the prices according 
to Taylor contracts for I periods. 
Model with physical capital externality 
Unlike the previous models, in the model with physical capital externality each 
intermediate goods producer is indexed by j  [0, 1] and has a Cobb−Douglas 
production function of the type: 
𝑌  𝐾 𝐾 𝐿  𝑑𝑠 𝐾 𝐾 𝐿 0 𝛼 1 (1.14) 
where 𝑌  is the production obtained by firm j with a capital stock 𝐾 , which is 
acquired from capital producers at the end of period t‐1. The index Kt = 𝐾jt dj is 
the stock of knowledge generated by capital accumulation, which firms take as 
given, and will be the source of economic growth (Romer, 1986). Intermediate 
goods firms are perfectly competitive. 











𝑑𝑠  (1.16) 
This labor demand function is common for all producers because  only depends 
on market elements (∆ , average real wage). Consequently, aggregating the 
production functions of all intermediate goods producers, assuming that they are 
identical and that the capital−labor ratio is common across them, we have the 
following expression for the output of intermediate goods: 
𝑌 𝐾 𝐿  (1.17) 
Considering capital market is competitive, the profitability rate (𝑟  can be 








Therefore, 𝑟  determines the allocation of capital to produce each intermediate 
good. As it depends only on market factors, we can conclude that it is common for 
all producers too. 
Moreover, given that we suppose absence of financial frictions, we must have: 
𝑟 𝑅  (1.19) 
Human capital model 
This model assumes also that there is a representative perfectly competitive 




  𝑌 𝐴𝐾 𝐿  (1.20) 
where 𝑌  is the output of a homogeneous intermediate good, 𝐴 total factor 
productivity, 𝐾  stock of physical capital, and 𝐿  the composite index of 
differentiated labor services. 
With regard to the labor demand, from profit maximization, we obtain the 
demand for labor service s of the firm j: 
     𝐿 1 𝛼 𝐴𝐾
𝑊
𝑃
𝐿  (1.21) 
where 𝐿  is the demand of the differentiated labor service s. The aggregated 
demand for labor is as follows: 
    𝐿 𝐾               𝐿 𝐿 𝑑𝑗 𝐾 𝐾 𝑑𝑗  (1.22) 
where Δ  again represents average real wage. The intermediate goods producers’ 






















Models with capital externality and human capital 
In the models where intermediate goods firms have a differentiated production 
function and operate in a competitive market (models where the source of growth 
is physical capital externality or human capital), there are an infinite number of 
retail firms over the continuum [0,1], which repackage the homogeneous 
intermediate goods and sell them to households. It is assumed that they have the 
same simplified production technology that converts one unit of homogeneous 
intermediate good into one unit of differentiated final good. Consequently, the final 
output Yt is composed of a continuum of retail final goods: 
𝑌 𝑌 𝑑𝑟  (1.26) 
where 𝑌  is the output of retailer r. If users of the final output minimize costs, the 




𝑌  (1.27) 
𝑃 𝑃 𝑑𝑗  (1.28) 
where 𝑃 is the price of  𝑌  and 𝑃  is the price index of the final output. They sell 
their goods to households and set the price according to Taylor contracts for each 






In the Schumpeterian model according to Aghion and Howitt (1992), the final 
goods production function is the following: 
Yt = 𝐿 𝐴 𝑥  di (1.29) 
where xit is the intermediate good i used at t, 0 𝛼 1, 𝐿 , the composite demand 
of labor services and Ait is its productivity (or quality level). The productivity 
evolves according to an innovation process, which will be explained later. 
The final goods producing sector is perfectly competitive, with firms choosing 
their inputs to maximize their profits. Consequently, the final goods producers´ 
profits can be represented as follows: 
𝐹  = 𝑃  𝐴 𝐿 𝑥  di – 𝑊 𝐿 𝑑𝑠 – 𝑃 𝑥 𝑑𝑖 (1.30) 
where Pit	is the price of the intermediate good i.  






where Δ   𝑑𝑠 represents average real wage, in this case with 
respect to the final goods price, unlike what happened in the models with physical 





Technological change model 
The final goods producers´ technology in the technological change model is similar 
to that of the Schumpeterian model, but slightly different. Specifically, the 
production function is as follows: 
𝑌 𝐿 𝑋  (1.32)
where the term: 
𝑋  𝑥 𝑑𝑖  (1.33)
is a Dixit−Stiglitz aggregate over a range of intermediate goods between 0 and 𝑍 . 
𝑍  represents the variety of this type of goods in period t; 𝜀 the elasticity of 
substitution across varieties; and 𝑥  the output of intermediate good i. 𝐿  
represents the composite demand of differentiated labor services. 












measures the average of the relative prices    at which intermediate goods are 
sold (𝑃  is the  intermediate goods price index . The labor demand function is 










The central bank is responsible for implementing monetary policy. It takes 
decisions about the short-term nominal interest rate (𝑅 ) in each period 






where R is the intercept reflecting structural factors in the reaction function of the 
central bank (which can be interpreted as the steady-state real interest rate),  is 
the steady-state gross inflation (or target) and  is the parameter that measures 
the central bank’s reaction to inflation deviations from the target. 
Finally, the relationship between real and nominal interest rate follows the Fisher 
equation: 
𝑅 𝑅 𝐸 Π (1.38) 
We only introduce equation (1.37) in the model with physical capital externality, 
while in the rest we assume trend inflation is given, as would be the case if this 








Every one of the four models is characterized by a different source of growth. 
Consequently, each growth engine must be explained individually. 
Model with capital externality 
The gross growth rate of the economy (𝑌 𝑌 ) coincides with the growth rate of 









This model displays Schumpeterian growth because growth occurs by increasing 
the quality of intermediate goods (Aghion and Howitt, 1992). By quality we must 
understand technological (or productivity) level of the capital goods.  
According to the intermediate goods demand function, the profit of the 







𝐴 𝐿  (1.40) 
So that, taking into account price rigidity during I	periods, the average expected 
profit in a period t for the intermediate producers after having had success in 
innovation is equal to: 











We assume the following diminishing returns probability function for the success 
of the innovation: 
𝜙 𝑛 𝑛 0 𝜒 1 (1.42) 
with 𝜙 𝑛 𝜒𝑛 0 and   𝜙 𝑛 𝜒 𝜒 1 𝑛 0  
If innovation is successful, expected profits will be 
𝜙 𝑛 𝑉𝐹∗   (1.43) 
where 𝑛 𝑅 𝐴∗  , 𝑅  being the quantity of final goods devoted to innovation 
and 𝐴∗  the intermediate goods productivity achieved if innovation is successful. 
Consequently, the expected profit of the R&D activity that can provide an 
innovation is: 
𝜙 𝑅 𝐴∗ 𝑉𝐹
∗  - 𝑅  (1.44) 
The optimal value of 𝑛  will be common to all entrepreneurs, due to the fact that 
n only depends on market elements: 







1  (1.45) 
According to the law of large numbers, the proportion of successful innovators 
will be 𝜇 ∅ 𝑛 . Consequently, the technological level of economy will be 




 𝐴 𝐴 𝑑𝑖 








𝑔 𝜇 𝛾 1 1 (1.48) 








1 𝛾 1 1 (1.49) 
Technological change model 
This section follows Amano, Carter and Moran (2012). Household members design 
new varieties of intermediate goods using an R&D technology, according to Evans 
Honkapohja and Romer (1998). In period t, this technology enables the innovator 
to develop intermediate good i at real cost  𝜂𝑖 . R&D thus causes the range of 
varieties 𝑍  to rise over time, which drives the growth process. When a variety has 
been designed, this design is patented and sold to a prospective intermediate 
goods producer. In return, the innovator receives a rent.  
We assume that the innovator is unaware of the pricing cohort and new patents 
are uniformly distributed across cohorts. As a consequence, a patent designed in 








in real dividends in each period s  t+1, where ℙ  denotes the real profits that 
producer i generates in period s. 
If we balance these dividends against the upfront cost of R&D, the investment 
𝑅&𝐷 𝜂 𝑖 𝑑𝑖 (1.51)





If we substitute for profits in this condition, we obtain the following expression in 














Balanced growth requires  𝜀 be chosen such that costs rise (or fall) to offset the 
effect of the demand externality. This is achieved through the following parameter 
restriction, according to Evans, Honkapohja and Romer  (1998): 
𝜌
1 𝜀 1 𝛼
𝜀 1 1 𝛼
 (1.54)
Final output is allocated across its various uses, with both the share of investment 






















Human capital model 
The growth process in the human capital model is derived from the solution of a 
dynamic optimization problem that is recorded in Appendix A.1 for price and wage 
flexibility and for staggered wage and price setting. As a consequence, final output 
Y, intermediate goods production Yi, physical capital stock K and effective labor L, 
grow at the same rate in steady state, which is the growth rate of average human 
capital h. Let 𝑔 .  be the growth rate of a variable at steady state, this situation 
implies the following relationships: 







1 𝜉 1 𝑢 𝑁          𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐹𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
1 𝜉 1 𝑢 𝑁 1 𝑔 ℎ 1 𝜉 1 𝑢 𝑁 1 𝑔 ℎ
1 𝜉 1 𝑢 𝑁 1 𝑔 ℎ 1 𝐽   𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦
 
(1.57)
where uss y Nss are steady-state values with wage flexibility, while u1 , h1 and N1 are 
the decisions for labor services with constant nominal wage for s∈ 0, J 2 ,  u01 , 
h01 and N1 for s∈ J 2, J 2 , and u0, h0	 and N0 for s∈ J 1, J 1  for the 
corresponding labor services that will reset nominal wage in the following period. 
 
1.2.3 Wage	and	price	setting	
We assume that the existence of price and wage rigidities leads to a Taylor-type 




account the preferences of the agents involved. In the case of wages these are the 
workers, given that we assume the equality between supply and demand for labor 
services, and in the case of prices, they are the corresponding firms in their profit 
maximization strategies. 
Wages	setting	
It is the intermediate goods producers who set wages for J periods in the models 
with physical capital externality and human capital, while in the Schumpeterian 
and technological change models it is the final goods firms. In both cases they set 
the wage W* at t for J periods according to households’ preferences, given the 
equality between labor supply and demand. The optimum wage for any type of 
labor service will be obtained from the maximization of the total discounted 
utility for every interval of  J period. 
Model with capital externality 




∑ 𝛽 𝐿 𝑃 ∆ 𝑃
∑ 𝛽𝐶 𝑃 ∆ 𝐿 𝑃
    (1.58) 







∑ 𝛽𝜏𝐿 1 𝜈𝐽 1𝜏 0 𝑃
𝑖𝜎 1 𝜈 𝑔𝜏∆𝑤
𝐾 𝜎 1 𝜈 Π𝜏𝜎 1 𝜈
∑ 𝛽𝜏𝐿𝑃𝑖𝜎 𝑔𝜏∆𝑤
















𝐸 ∑ 𝛽 𝑃 𝐾 𝐿 𝑁 𝑢 ℎ
𝐸 ∑ 𝛽 𝐶 𝑃 𝐾 𝐿
 (1.61)






















𝑁 𝑁  for  𝜏 0, 1, 2, … , 𝐽 2 
𝑁 𝑁  for  𝜏 𝐽 1 
Schumpeterian model 
Optimal nominal wage: 





Steady-state real wage normalized by final good output: 
𝑊∗
𝑃𝑌




∑ 𝛽𝜏𝐽 1𝜏 0 𝑔
𝜏∆𝑤
𝑌 𝜎 1 1 𝑣 Π𝜎 1 𝑣 𝜏𝑔 1 𝑣 𝜏
∑ 𝛽𝜏𝐽 1𝜏 0 𝑔
𝜏∆𝑤









Technological change model 







∑ 𝛽 𝑃 𝑌 𝐿
∑ 𝛽𝐶 𝑃 𝑌 𝐿
 (1.65)











According to the previous paragraphs, in the models with capital externality and 
human capital as sources of growth, it is the retail firms who set the price that 
maximizes their expected profits for every I period, while it is the intermediate 
goods producers who do so in the Schumpeterian and technological change 
models. 
Model with capital externality 








𝑃  (1.67) 
where 𝑌 𝑃∗
∗
𝑌   and  𝜆 is  the wealth marginal utility of consumers, 
identified as the Lagrange multiplier of the utility maximization. We use the 
quotient between two periods as discount factor.  







𝐸 ∑ 𝛽 𝑃
𝑌
𝐶 𝑃









∑ 𝛽 Π 𝑃
∑ 𝛽Π
 (1.69) 
As the problem to be solved is the same as in the other models, we present only the 
final expressions below. 
Human capital model 




𝐸 ∑ 𝛽 𝑃
𝑌
𝐶 𝑃




Relative price in steady state: 

















where 𝑥 𝑃∗  is the demand of the intermediate good i in 𝑡 𝜏 with the price 













Technological change model 






𝐶 𝐿 𝑋 𝑃
∑ 𝛽
𝐶
𝐶 𝐿 𝑋 𝑃
 (1.74) 












The aggregate equilibrium of the economy in the four models is the equality 
between final output and the sum of consumption and gross investment. We 
assume, for the sake of simplicity, that there are neither public expenditures nor 
an external sector. However, we must also consider some specific characteristics 
of each model.  
Model with physical capital externality 
The final goods output of the economy weighted by the price dispersion is 




𝑌 ∆ 𝑌  (1.76) 
where 𝑌  is final good output of the economy, 𝑌  the output of the intermediate 








Final good output is equal to the sum of consumption, R&D investment and 
intermediate goods production: 
𝑌 𝐶 𝑅&𝐷 𝑥 𝑑𝑖 (1.78) 
























Technological change model 
With regard to the technological change model, final good output is also composed 
of consumption, investment in R&D and intermediate goods production. As a 



















Human capital model 
Final good output is composed of consumption and investment, and the steady-







𝑔 𝐾 𝛿 (1.81)
Since the right-hand side is constant over time in steady state, consumption and 









𝑔 𝐶 𝛿 (1.82)






Considering that our objective is to analyse the long-term behavior of the 
economy, we must define the steady state and the system of equations that 




models incorporate economic growth and some variables grow in steady state, 
these variables must be normalized.  
In the model with capital externality, economic growth is represented by the 
gross growth rate of capital gt+1 = 
 
 
  (=  
 
. Consequently, the normalization of 
all the growing variables must be done through the capital stock. The system of 
equations is presented in section A2.1 of Appendix A. The endogenous variables 








 and 𝐶 . 
Regarding the Schumpeterian and technological change models, the 
normalization of all the growing variables is carried out dividing them by the 
production level of the final good 𝑌 . The systems of equations are respectively 

















and 𝐶 in the technological change model. 
Finally, taking into account the representative household’s optimal control 
problem of human capital model developed in Appendix A.1, the steady-state 
system of equations is different depending on the existence or not of wage rigidity. 
If wages are flexible, the system is characterized by 6 unknowns: 𝑊∗ 𝑃⁄  , 𝐶 𝐾⁄ , 
𝑔 𝐶 , 𝑁 ,  𝑃∗ 𝑃⁄  and Δ𝑃. If there is wage rigidity, it is characterized by 10 
unknowns, according to Appendix A2.2: 𝑊∗ 𝑃⁄ , ∆ , 𝐶 𝐾⁄ , 𝑔 𝐶 , 𝑁 , 𝑁 , 𝑢 , 𝑢 , 𝑃∗ 𝑃⁄  
and Δ . The system of equations is presented in Section A2.4. 
 





In this section the models will be simulated in order to obtain the values of the 
different variables in steady state and their responses to changes in trend inflation, 
depending on the kind of rigidity. The values of the parameters for each model are 
presented in Table	1.1. These values are appropriate for quarterly data and are 
common when they appear in more than one model in order to analyze 
comparable economies. 
Table	1.1: The choice of parameter values 
	
 











𝛿 Capital depreciation rate 0.048   0.048 
𝛼 Output elasticity with respect to 
capital 
0.332 0.332 0.332 0.332
𝛽 Utility discount factor 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
𝜀 Elasticity of substitution among 
retail or intermediate goods 
1.40  1.40 1.40 
𝜙  Coefficient of inflation reaction in 
the Taylor rule 
2.05 2.05 2.05 2.05
𝜎 Elasticity of substitution among 
labor services 
10 10 10 10
𝜈 Relative utility weight of  labor 1 1 1 1 
I Periods it takes to reset prices 1, 2 1, 2 1, 2 1, 2 
J Periods it takes to reset wages 1, 4 1, 4 1, 4 1, 4 
 Productivity upgrade after every 
innovation 
 1.009   
𝜒 Elasticity of the probability of 
success in the innovation with 
respect to relative investment  
 0.1   
 Innovation costs elasticity   0.1  
𝜂 Unit cost of innovation   10  
𝜉 Productivity parameter of human 
capital accumulation 
   0.018 




The values chosen for parameters ,	 and 𝜙  are usually found in simulations of 
DSGE models. The value of capital depreciation δ has been chosen in order to 
obtain plausible values of annual growth rates (around the interval 2% − 3%). 
The elasticity of substitution for retail or intermediate goods () and 
differentiated labor services (σ) are set at 1.4 and 10, respectively. The first value 
responds also to the search of plausible growth rates. The second value is 
consistent with the findings reported in Basu (1996) and Basu and Fernald 
(1997). The disutility of the labor parameter, , is assigned a value of one, as in 
Hornstein and Wolman (2005). The length of price contracts I is set to 2 when 
there is no price flexibility (I=1), based on results reported in Bils and Klenow 
(2004). The length of wage contracts J is set equal to 4 when there is no wage 
flexibility (J=1), as in Erceg Henderson and Levin (2000) and Huang and Liu 
(2002). Taylor (1999) provided a review of the empirical literature, concluding 
that the average frequency of wage changes is about one year. The rest of the 
parameters (,	𝜒,	,	, 𝜂, 𝜉,	A) are present only in one model and the values are very 




Firstly, in order to analyze the impact of the different types of rigidity on the 
steady-state relationship between trend inflation and log-run growth, it is 




1.1 shows with a blue line how the quarterly growth rate remains constant at 
0.541% whatever the inflation rate.  
Secondly, if we calibrate the model with only price rigidity (I=2, J=1) and simulate 
it for different values of trend inflation, we obtain the same relationship between 
inflation and growth as for flexibility (dotted green line). As a consequence, price 
rigidity does not have any impact on growth rate. 
 
Figure	1.1:	Long-term inflation−growth relationship for different types of rigidity − Model with physical 
capital externality. 
 
Regarding only wage rigidity (I=1, J=4), if we simulate the calibrated model for 
different values of inflation, we obtain the relationship between inflation and 
growth displayed in Figure 1.1 as the continuous purple line with a maximum of 
0.541% (at the same value as when wages are flexible). However, this value is 
reached for a deflation rate of -0.541% (-2.18% annual).  When inflation or 
deflation rate is different from this value, the greater the difference the lower 
long-run growth is. Consequently, the long-run relationship between inflation and 

































allocation of resources for values of the trend inflation rate different from -
0.541%, which is the same rate as the growth rate with flexibility with the 
negative sign.  If we calibrate the model with simultaneously both kinds of 
rigidity, wage rigidity dominates price rigidity and the outcome is the same as 
with only wage rigidity (an inverted-U shape with maximum growth rate 0.541% 
for a trend inflation rate of -0.541%). 
To end the summary of the simulations of this model we can revise the shape of 
the lines as well as the importance of the effects that trend inflation has on the 
growth rate. There are three characteristics to be highlighted. The first is the lack 
of impact of trend inflation on long-run growth with only price rigidity. The 
second, the symmetry around the inflation rate value -0.541% in the case of wage 
rigidity (with or without price rigidity).	 The third and very important 
characteristic is the very low effect that inflation rate has on the long-run growth 
rate under wage rigidity. For example, a change of 4 percentage points in the 
annual inflation rate from -2.18% affects the growth rate only in less than two 
tenths of a percentage point. Really it is a very low effect. 
 
1.3.2 Schumpeterian	model	
The long-run inflation−growth relationship in the Schumpeterian model of 
endogenous growth with flexible wage and price is shown as the horizontal blue 
line in Figure 1.2, so that the long-run growth rate is independent of the inflation 
rate at the quarterly value of 0.511%,. As in the previous model, when only price 
rigidity is present (J=1, I>1), the result is the same as in the case of flexibility 




When only wage rigidity is present we also find an inverted-U-shaped 
relationship. The growth is maximum at a quarterly rate of 0.511% when Π = 
0.99489. That is, if prices fall at the quarterly rate of -0.511% (-2.06% annual) the 
economy reaches the maximum growth rate, but this rate diminishes as inflation 
moves futher away from -0.511%. Once again, the maximum growth rate takes 
place for an inflation rate of the same value and negative sign and this is the value 
corresponding to price and wage flexibility. 
Taking into account that price rigidity does not affect the growth rate of 
flexibility, it is a direct result that when price and wage rigidity simultaneously 
exist (dotted red line), the long-run relationship between inflation and growth is 
the same as when only wage rigidity exists. 
We can also appreciate the existence of symmetry around the inflation rate value 
‐0.511% in the case of wage rigidity (with or without price rigidity).	Finally, with 
wages rigidity, we find again a very low effect of trend inflation on the long-run 
growth rate. In this model the effect is even lower than in the previous one. A 
change of 4 percentage points in the annual inflation rate from -2.06% affects the 










In the model of technological change, the results are very close to the previous 
ones. The long-run relationship between inflation and growth with flexible prices 
and wages	is a constant line, that is, the quarterly growth rate remains constant 
whatever the inflation rate at 0.571%. This is shown by the blue line in Figure 1.3. 
The same happens in the case of price rigidity: growth rate continues being 
independent of trend inflation and it remains at the same value as flexibility. 
If we simulate the model of wage rigidity for different values of trend inflation, we 
also obtain an inverted U-shaped curve that is represented by the purple line in 
Figure 1.3. The value of the inflation rate that makes growth maximum is -0.571% 
(-2.3% annual), and the maximum growth rate is 0.571%, the same value with the 
opposite sign and the value in the cases of flexibility and only price rigidity. As in 
the previous models, wage rigidity dominates price rigidity and, hence, the 


































Figure	1.3:	Long-term inflation−growth relationship for different types of rigidity − Technological change 
model. 
 
We can see again the symmetry of the relationship around the inflation rate value 
‐0.571% in the case of wage rigidity (with or without price rigidity). Moreover, as 
in the two previous models under wage rigidity,	trend inflation has a low effect on 
the long-run growth rate. A change of 4 percentage points in the annual inflation 
rate from -2.3% affects the growth rate only in two hundredths of a percentage 
point.   
 
1.3.4 Human	capital	model	
We do not find any difference in the model of human capital (Figure 1.4) compared 
to the previous ones in terms of flexibility and price rigidity: the long-run 
inflation−growth relationship is a horizontal line in the value of growth rate 



































The biggest difference related to the three previous models is found in the case of 
wage rigidity: the growth rate is maximized for a null inflation. At that point, the 
growth rate is the same as in the case of flexible wages (0.787% quarterly, 3.18% 
annual). As a consequence, if we consider both kinds of rigidities, the growth rate 




Figure	1.4:	Long-term inflation−growth relationship for different types of rigidity − Human capital model. 
 
We can also appreciate the existence of symmetry around null inflation for rigid 
wages.	 However, this model not only	 provides a difference from the three 
previous models in the value of trend inflation that maximizes the long-run 
growth rate. It also shows a sharp difference when the effect of trend inflation on 
the growth rate is considered. Now the units are not hundredths or tenths of a 
percentage point. A change in the annual inflation or deflation rate of 2 
percentage points from 0 is the cause of a decline of 2.75 percentage points in the 





































The independence of long-run growth and trend inflation when only rigidity in 
prices exists is a result that appears in all four models. Under this type of rigidity, 
the impact of trend inflation on long-run growth is so limited that the growth rate 
remains constant for admissible values of trend inflation. Table 1.2 summarizes 
the inflation rate that maximizes the growth rate depending on the different 
rigidities and models.  It is noteworthy that the behavior when both rigidities exist 
is always the same as when only wage rigidity exists, but above all, one result in 
the human capital model stands out: the long-run growth rate is maximum for a 
null inflation when wages are rigid. 
 










Prices	rigidity	 	 	 	 	
Wages	rigidity	 	 	 	 	
Prices	and	wages	rigidity	 	 	 	 	
 Long-run growth and trend inflation are independent.  
 




for a value of trend inflation where long-run growth rate is the same as for 
flexibility (Table 1.3). For values differing from this one, the greater the difference 
between the two inflation rates the lower the growth rate. This value of trend 
inflation is negative and equal in absolute value to the maximum growth rate, 
showing that a clear compensation exists between the two rates. 











Total	flexibility	 0.541 %   
Prices	rigidity	 0.541 %	 	 	 	
Wages	rigidity	 0.541 % 	 	 	
Prices	and	wages	rigidity	 0.541 %	 	 	 	
 
Moreover, the maximum growth rate with wage rigidity is the same as with price 
and wage flexibility, indicating that, in fact, the growth rate is reached because the 
two situations are, for this trend inflation rate, equivalent. Effectively, with this 
inflation rate the revision of the nominal wage is not necessary because the 
deflation adjusts real wage in the right amount to obtain the real wage target. 
When trend inflation is different from this value a distortion is introduced in the 
demand for labor that reduces the long-run growth rate in a greater amount the 
greater the difference. 




real wage when trend inflation is different from a rate equal to the growth rate 
corresponding to price and wage flexibility with negative sign, which decreases the 
labor demand and affects the long-run growth rate negatively. In fact, inflation acts 
in this case as a negative productivity shock. When trend inflation is negative at 
exactly the same value as the growth rate, nominal wage revision is not necessary. 
This is exactly the same situation as wage flexibility. This is the case of the 
maximum growth in the first three models. The long-run real wage individuals 
receive will grow as with flexibility, thanks to the falling trend of prices.  
In the case of human capital wage rigidity does not affect the growth component of 
the variable, it only affects the wage-per-unit of human capital. Wage contracts 
revise with flexibility the skill components of the contracts. The distortion 
previously indicated is not present and this is why the maximum growth is 
reached for null inflation. The long-run real wage individuals receive will grow 
thanks to long-run human capital accumulation.  
 
 Transmission	mechanisms	
Having evaluated and compared, through simulations, the impact rigidities have 
on the long-run relationship between inflation and growth in the four models, it is 
necessary to identify the main mechanisms in the equations of the steady state 
that make the relationship between Π and g similar in some cases and different in 
others, depending on the model and the sort of rigidity. To do so, in this section 
we consider separately the existence of the distortion in the labor market 
introduced by wage rigidity as the key factor in the dependence or independence 




capital model shows two so highly differentiated results related to the other three 
models: maximum long-run growth rate for null trend inflation, and a significant 
long-run impact on inflation and growth. 
 
1.5.1 Model	with	physical	capital	externality		
In order to clarify the mechanisms that take place in the steady state, it is 
convenient to summarize the main equations that drive the dynamics. In this 
model, the key variable in the steady state is Pi, the price of the intermediate 
goods. The behavior of the final good price and investment depends crucially on 
this variable. 
Using expressions (A2.1.3), (A2.1.4), (A2.1.5), (A2.1.9), and (A2.1.10) from 
Appendix A.2, the behavior of the long-run growth rate can be written as: 
g/β=αPi	L(1‐a)	+1‐δ	 (1.83) 
From equations (A2.1.13) y (A2.1.11) in Appendix A.2, it is clear that the steady-
state (relative) price of the intermediate good (Pi) is given with price rigidity 
when Π is known and independent from it with price flexibility.  
Once the value of Pi is known, the long-run value of g depends only on the value of 
L, whose behavior is different for the different types of rigidities. This is the main 
relationship to be considered in the mechanisms described below. 
If we consider flexible prices and wages, neither P*/P, nor p, nor ∆kw, Ck nor 𝑃  
depend on . So L is also independent of the gross inflation rate. The price of the 




the gross inflation rate, the price of the intermediate goods is also independent of 
 and, as a consequence, the long-run growth rate g  
As we have deduced in the preceding section, if there is price and wage flexibility, 
changes in the long-run inflation rate do not affect the value of the growth rate of 
the economy, and the only variable affected is the nominal rate Rst.  
Regarding price rigidity, although at first sight growth should not remain 
constant, we cannot observe a decline in growth rate when inflation has values 
far away from 0. The variations in P*/P, p, ∆kw, Ck and 𝑃 are insignificant for a 
wide range of plausible values of trend inflation (-4% to 4%, quarterly). For those 
values, the long-run intermediate good price remains constant as well as L and, 
consequently, growth rate remains constant.  
If we only consider wage rigidity, Δkw, Ck and L depend on . So g also depends on 
the gross inflation rate, even though the prices of the final and intermediate goods 
do not. In this case, the labor demand is distorted by a mark-up depending on 
in the real wage, the key variable being Δwk. This average wage has a minimum, 
which implies a maximum for Land, as a consequence of (1.83), a maximum 
long-term growth rate when is less than one with positive growth. This 
behavior of ΔW is the reason why the relationship between long-run growth and 
trend inflationhas an inverted-U shape.	wk is then the variable containing the 
distortion wage rigidity introduces into the labor market and consequently into 
the long-run economic growth. 
Finally, if we analyze the behavior of rigidities in prices and wages, Δkw, Ck and L 
depend on as a result of the presence of rigid wages, so too do, P*/P, p, and Pi 




neutrality of the last set of variables. Consequently, the behavior is the same as in 
the case of wage rigidity. The relationship between g and  has an inverted-U 
shape, with the maximum value at the same point as when only wage rigidity 
exists, which is exactly the same as in the case of flexibility (when Δkw is 
minimum) given the independence between g	 and Π in the case of price rigidity. 
 
1.5.2 Schumpeterian	model	
The results in the Schumpeterian model are similar to those of the physical 
capital externality model, in spite of the differences in their economic structures 
and dynamics. Trend inflation barely has an influence on the long-run growth rate 
in the model with only price rigidity. Although the terms 
∗





 are negligible while on w, C/Y 
and A/Y are null as can be seen in A2.2.7, A2.2.5, A2.2.4 and A2.2.6. The effect on L 
is also null and, as a result, long-run growth rate remains constant according to 
A2.2.2.  
The situation is different with only wage rigidity for any value of Π because the 
distortion introduced by the inflation rate in the mark-up of the wage affects ∆  
in A2.2.4 and L in A2.2.3 and, finally, the growth rate in A2.2.2. In fact, as in the 
previous situation, L has a maximum when ∆   is minimum, which coincides with 
a value of  less than one. Then, according to the expression (A2.2.2), the 
maximum growth rate occurs for a quarterly deflation rate of -0.5% making L	
maximum. When rigidity takes place in wages and prices, the result is the same as 




under price rigidity. Once again, we find the distortion in the labor market 
introduced as a consequence of wage rigidity. 
 
1.5.3 Technological	change	model	
The results under the technological change model are very similar to the previous 
ones. When only price rigidity exists, the terms ∑
∗ ∗
1   and P 
change with  but the effects of the changes in  are so limited that they are 
hardly noticeable for fair values of trend inflation, and the same happens with P, 
C/Y and W. As these terms are then independent of as well asL from A2.3.1, the 
long-run growth rate remains constant from A2.3.6 for values of annual trend 
inflation from -12% to 12%. 	
Regarding wage rigidity, P and P*/P are independent of as well asthe 
term ∑
∗ ∗
1 The distortion introduced by the inflation rate in the 
revision of wages has a clear effect in A2.3.1 on L and, finally, on the growth rate as 
can be seen in A2.3.6. In fact, as in the previous models, L has a clear maximum 
when  is less than one with positive growth and ∆  is minimum. When L is 
maximum, long-run growth rate also reaches its maximum value according to the 
expression (A2.3.6). If we consider both types of rigidities in wages and prices, the 
behavior is the same as with wage rigidity due to the limited effect of on g when 







The results in the model of human capital have many aspects in common with the 
three previous ones but in one key aspect they are much more significant and 
different. Regarding price rigidity, the effects of on P, P*/P, C and W are 
negligible and on L they are so limited that they are not noticeable until quarterly 
inflation/deflation rate values are greater than 12−15%. Consequently, according 
to A2.4.4, g(C) is independent of the same behavior observed with flexibility in 
prices and wages. 
However, if we consider wage rigidity, the effect of on g is a consequence of the 
variation in the wage wage-per-unit of human capital (A2.4.1), since wage 
contracts revise with flexibility the skill components of the contracts, and in W	
(A2.4.2). The distortion in the labor market is only present due to the inflation rate 
as is reflected in A2.4.2. As A2.4.4 establishes a univocal (and inverse) relationship 
between W and g(C), the maximum growth is reached when W is minimum, that 
is, for null inflation. 
Regarding wage and price rigidity, the situation is similar to previous models. As 
with price rigidity, the relationship between and g is practically null for 




The analysis of four models with different growth engines in order to understand 




The results confirm that monetary policy may be non-neutral in the long run in a 
context of endogenous growth and non-zero trend inflation. The main conclusions 
on the relationship between trend inflation and long-run growth are obtained from 
simulations of the four models using Dynare. 
Firstly, the neutrality of trend inflation (monetary policy) on the long-run growth 
has been confirmed for admissible values of trend inflation in the four models 
when only price rigidity exists. These values depend on each model. For a model 
with physical capital externality, long-run growth rate remains constant for values 
of the quarterly rate of inflation/deflation lower than 4%; however, for the rest of 
the models, that neutrality remains up to values of 12−15%.  
Secondly, when wage rigidity exists, an inverted-U shape is clearly confirmed in 
the four models for the relationship between the long-run rates of inflation and 
growth (non-neutrality of the monetary policy). Moreover, the influence of wage 
rigidity on growth dominates the relationship “trend inflation−long-run growth” 
when both rigidities coexist, showing the same behavior as when only wage 
rigidity exists. 
A central objective was to confirm whether one of the conclusions of Amano et al. 
(2009) and Amano, Carter and Moran (2012)— namely, that with price and wage 
rigidity a negative trend inflation maximizes long-run growth rate—can be 
generalized regardless the growth engine. Our results lead us to conclude clearly 
the rejection of the general validity of this conclusion. Firstly, because when only 
price rigidity exists, long-run growth rate is independent of trend inflation for 
usual values of inflation or deflation rates. But also, the result cannot be 




corresponding to human capital accumulation, the long-run growth rate is 
maximized for null trend inflation. 
It has been shown, in sum, that although there are three growth models for which 
wage rigidity implies a maximum growth rate for negative trend inflation 
(deflation), the result cannot be generalized for all the growth engines, because at 
least the human capital model is an exception.  
When trend inflation is non-null, each revision of wages in the first three models 
when growth is positive elevates in excess their real values. This excess 
additionally decreases the labor demand in such a way that steady-state growth 
rate is negatively affected, acting as a greater distortion than when there is not 
growth. Our results indicate that if the trend inflation rate is negative, at exactly 
the same absolute value as the growth rate corresponding to price and wage 
flexibility, long-run growth rate is maximum in exactly the same situation as 
flexibility in which nominal wage revision is not necessary for recovering 
productivity growth. Any other value of trend inflation introduces a distortion that 
is greater, the greater the difference from this negative value. 
In the human capital model, wage rigidity does not affect the productivity 
component of the variable, affecting only the wage-per-unit of human capital. 
Wage contracts contemplate separately the skill aspects and revise them with 
flexibility. The distortion due to positive growth indicated in the previous 
paragraph is not present and this is why the maximum growth is reached for null 
inflation, again a situation that is equivalent to price and wage flexibility. 
This difference is not the only one existing between the human capital model and 




one of the characteristics of the other three models is the negligible effect that 
trend inflation has on the long-run growth rate. In fact, we have seen that this 
effect is less than one hundredth of an annual percentage point for a change of four 
percentage points of the annual inflation rate in the Schumpeterian model, two 
hundredths in the technological change model, and less than two tenths in the 
model of physical capital externality. In contrast to them, in the human capital 
model this effect is much more significant, given that for a change of two 
percentage points of the annual inflation rate, the effect on the growth rate is a 
decline of more than two percentage points. This is an important effect that 
suggests the convenience of considering labor skill in the analysis of the effects of 
nominal wage rigidity, especially when they are considered from the economic 
growth perspective. The reason for this difference is the effect that the distortion 
in the average wage introduces in the demand for labor, which eventually affects 


























Labor	 force	participation	 and	 growth	 in	 the	 long	 run:	 a	
New‐Keynesian	 extension	 of	 Friedman’s	 Phillips	 curve	
revision 
Abstract	
Although our objective is to show how the existence of unemployment affects the long-run 
relationship between inflation and growth in a New-Keynesian model with efficiency wages, 
endogenous growth and Taylor-type stickiness, we find as a result an extension of Friedman's 
critique to the Phillips curve that provides a more general long-run perspective than the usual 
found in mainstream macroeconomic theory. This extension maintains the 
inflation/unemployment independence (unemployment natural rate hypothesis), but employment 
and labor force participation rates acquire a protagonist role given that both rates are maximum 
precisely for the trend inflation rate value that maximizes the long-run growth with sticky wages 
(per worker as well as per unit of human capital).  
The meaning of this result is that the trend inflation rate value for which the natural rate of 
unemployment takes place is not indifferent, as it does in Friedman’s critique to the Phillips curve, 
because it is associated, when wages are sticky, to different growth, employment, and labor force 
participation rates. The wealth of interactions and possibilities of the mechanisms through which 
this association takes place is exposed in two endogenous growth models corresponding to the 
alternative wage-setting processes. 
	
 Introduction	
The conclusions of the first chapter have allowed us to know the relationship 
between trend inflation and long-run growth for different nominal rigidities and 
growth engines. On that basis, we can confirm the non-neutrality of the monetary 
policy as a consequence of the existence of wage stickiness, the behavior of the 




that the value of trend inflation that maximizes long-run growth rate depends on 
whether the type of wage-setting process is per worker or per unit of human 
capital. These results have led us to reject the general validity of the results of 
Amano et al. (2009) and Amano, Carter and Moran (2012), according to which a 
negative trend inflation rate maximizes long-run growth in a context of price and 
wage stickiness.  
Through this second chapter we will continue studying this relationship, 
integrating new variables that provide a more general perspective, which, except 
for a few rare exceptions, are not usually considered in macroeconomic models. 
Specifically, we analyze what is the impact on the quoted previous results of 
considering that labor supply no longer equals to labor demand and, therefore, 
unemployment appears in the economy. The objective is to know how a distortion 
in the labor market, which leads to unemployment, affects the relationship 
between trend inflation and long-run growth. 
We can find different precedents in the existing literature on the link between 
unemployment and economic growth in the long run. Bean and Pissarides (1993) 
were the first to study this relationship. They concluded, using an overlapping-
generations model, that adverse labor market institutions raise the unemployment 
rate and lower the employment and economic growth rates, establishing the 
existence of a negative relation between unemployment and growth rates in the 
long run. The same result was obtained by Eriksson (1997) in a model that was 
basically the same except for infinitely lived households. Both references assumed 





Chen, Hsu and Lai (2016) take these results as a point of departure but, given that 
the labor force participation (LFP) has changed substantially across member 
countries of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
they consider endogenous labor force participation. From this perspective, the 
changes in labor market institutions may cause increases or decreases in the long-
run economic growth, depending on the effects on the employment rate. In fact, 
these changes may also affect the unemployment rate in a non-monotone way, 
which is consistent with the data. 
Likewise, Schubert and Turnovsky (2018) delve into the long-run relationship 
between growth and unemployment, considering the role of job search during 
unemployment and wage bargaining. They conclude that, while the short-run 
trade-offs between unemployment and growth are substantial, the long-run trade-
offs are much weaker. According to them, an increase in total factor productivity 
would lead to an immediate significant increase in growth, accompanied equally by 
a decline in unemployment. During the subsequent period, the unemployment rate 
would return almost totally to its initial equilibrium value. As a result, although we 
can find an immediate strong negative relationship, after a short period this 
relation switches to a strong positive one that neutralizes all the effects on 
unemployment. This conclusion is much closer than the previous references to a 
traditional and generally accepted macroeconomic result as it is the critique 
Friedman made of the Phillips curve 50 years ago.   
The results of this chapter come to confirm Friedman’s criticism of the Phillips 
curve in the long run in 1967, introducing some additional endogenous labor 




not only unemployment, but also employment and LFP. This shift in the focus 
provides important and apparently groundbreaking conclusions, given the more 
general perspective that it is able to provide for the macroeconomic dynamics. A 
first result confirms the irrelevance of unemployment rate as a long-run key 
macroeconomic variable in the labor market, being replaced by the employment 
and labor force participation rates. In fact, we can confirm by means of simulations 
using Dynare that the trend inflation rate that maximizes long-run growth rate is 
independent of the unemployment rate but, by contrast, it maximizes 
simultaneously the employment and labor force participation rates. 
These results contain significant promise, beyond the confirmation of Friedman’s 
hypothesis of the independence between trend inflation and unemployment in the 
long run, because it seems that they could represent a relevant New-Keynesian 
extension of Friedman’s Phillips curve critique. Effectively, this critique is 
confirmed as certain, but this cannot be the end of the labor market story in the 
long run. The constant long-run unemployment rate is compatible with many 
values of the labor force participation and employment rates, two variables with a 
great factual economic impact but with hardly any presence in theoretical 
macroeconomic analysis. In our results they appear as two key labor market 
variables in the relationship between trend inflation and long-run growth from the 
perspective of the monetary policy summarized by the trend inflation rate as the 
inflation target. 
Some authors have recently focused their attention on the evolution of the LFP. 
Van Zandweghe (2012) and Bullard (2014) admit the endogeneity of the LFP and 




period 2007−2009. While the first author admits that half of the decline in LFP is 
accounted for by trend factors and the other half by cyclical factors, the second 
attributes almost all the decline to trend factors. However, none of these authors 
explain what moves the long-run LFP rate if unemployment rate is constant and 
demographic factors are stable in the long run. Could any monetary policy 
measure be adopted? Our results confirm the relationship between trend inflation 
and LFP and, therefore, the possibility of adopting monetary policy decisions to 
affect it. In fact, given the great concern about the LFP rate in the USA, the new 
Chair of the Federal Reserve System was alerted in 2017 about the relevance of 
this magnitude by the editors of Bloomberg (Saraiva and Matthews, 2017). 
The economic tradition has accepted for 50 years that trend inflation does not 
affect unemployment rate (Friedman´s Phillips curve critique), although we cannot 
always find a clear alignment with this macroeconomic core element if we review 
the literature. In fact, almost all the previous quoted contributions do not take it 
into account, or they contradict it.  
Blanchard (2017), by contrast, in his speech to the American European Association 
(AEA), when Friedman´s contribution celebrated its 50th birthday, admitted to the 
concerns about the low LFP rate and suggested keeping an open mind about 
adding some weight to alternative monetary policy measures. He pointed out that 
if the USA output were allowed to exceed the potential for some time, some of the 
workers who left the labor force during the previous ten years could be 
reintegrated. The mechanisms through which this reintegration could be 
permanent were not indicated, but at least Blanchard’s reflection admits the 




sensitivity to the monetary policy. 
But Blanchard was making his proposal using an argument that could be 
inappropriate from the perspective of our contribution. He was suggesting that a 
higher inflation target could be helpful in encouraging more entries in the labor 
market but, according to the results we obtain below, the effect of a greater 
inflation target would be the opposite to that indicated in his suggestion.  
This discrepancy brought to the fore the relevance of the matter at hand. Our 
results confirm the macroeconomic relevance of the LFP rate in the long run 
beyond the independence between long-run unemployment rate and trend 
inflation, as well as its nonlinear response to trend inflation and the coincidence 
between its best behavior and the best for output growth and welfare when wages 
are sticky.  
To address the analysis of this chapter, we will use two of the four growth models 
analyzed in the previous chapter: the Schumpeterian growth model of Aghion and 
Howitt and the Lucas human capital model. We will start from these models as 
they have been characterized in Chapter 1, introducing in detail the specific 
features corresponding to the considerations of unemployment. Efficiency wages 
are set according to Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), which allow the introduction of 
unemployment and labor force participation rates as endogenous variables. This 
theory involves incentive problems, which reduce labor demand and generate 
unemployment that acts as a discipline mechanism for the workers. Moreover, we 
must carefully select the variables that play the role of labor supply and demand in 
the models, taking into account that New-Keynesian models introduce leisure in 




the Taylor staggered price and wage-setting mechanisms to the asymmetric 
information distortion introduced. All these features are explained in Section 2. 
Section 3 presents the relationship between inflation, growth, unemployment, 
employment and labor force participation rates, which confirms the relevance of 
the last two rates in the maximization of the long-run growth rate. Section 4 
contains the assessment of the main effect of considering wage stickiness on the 
long-run growth rate and how the value of the parameters can influence the final 
results. Section 5 contains the sensitivity analysis of economic and labor market 
variables to changes in efficiency wage parameters. Finally, section 6 summarizes 
the main findings.  
In spite of having added many additional results, the extension contained in this 
second chapter maintains the validity of the main conclusions of the first chapter, 
that is, the non-neutrality of monetary policy under wage stickiness and the 
different behavior of the trend inflation–growth relationship depending on the 
wage-setting process (per hour or per unit of human capital). In the same way, the 
higher influence of the monetary policy on the long-run growth rate when wages 





On the basis of two of the models analyzed in Chapter 1, the Schumpeterian and 
human capital models, we introduce a labor market friction. This friction involves, 




labor supply (labor force participation) and, on the other hand, redefining the 
wage-setting process, since we no longer consider labor supply equals labor 
demand and, hence, the approach used in Chapter 1 to apply Taylor staggered 
mechanism must be discarded and adequately substituted. Efficiency wages have 
been considered to introduce the distortion causing unemployment, according to 
which the steady-state wage makes consistent the workers’ incentives with the 
firms’ objectives. These modifications allow us to obtain the labor supply and 
demand and the corresponding unemployment rate. 
Regarding the rest of the equations describing the behavior of the agents, for 
example those describing price stickiness, no changes have been introduced and 
the expressions of Chapter 1 are maintained. 
Price stickiness has been again considered for two periods, and wage stickiness for 
four. The expression for the sticky wage has been obtained through cumulative 




As in the previous chapter, household members offer labor to intermediate or final 
good producers, depending on the model, consume the final good and hold bonds. 
However, unlike the first chapter, we assume that supply and demand for labor are 
no longer equal. Consequently, expected intertemporal utility takes the form: 
E 𝛽 log 𝐶
1
1 𝜈




where 𝑁  represents only the supply of labor (FFP) for service s with s ∈ 0,1 , 
while Ls will be the labor demand of the firms for this labor service s. 
Furthermore, households must satisfy their budget constraint, which prevents the 
present value of the expenditure exceeding the stream of income and the value of 
their initial assets. However, unlike Chapter 1, the budget constraints must 
consider the effect of unemployment, the unemployment subsidy and the way this 
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𝑅 D 1 𝑑 1 𝜏
𝑊
𝑃
𝑢 𝑁 ℎ 𝑑𝑠 𝑧 𝑑 𝑁 ℎ  𝑑𝑠
1 𝑅 𝛿 𝐾  
(2.3) 
where dt represents unemployment rate, 𝜏  the tax on the wages, and 𝑧  the subsidy 
paid to the unemployed. The rest of the variables are the same as in Chapter 1: Ct is 
consumption, Bt nominal value of the stock of one-period life bonds that 
households hold in their portfolios, Pt the price of the final good, R&Dt investment 
in research and development, Rt real gross interest rate, 
𝑅  nominal gross interest rate, Dt firms’ dividends, us proportion of time a service 
s employed devotes to production, hst the human capital of the labor service s and 
Wst nominal wage for labor service s. 
We assume the existence of government’s budgetary equilibrium, which implies 








1 𝑑 𝑁  𝑑𝑠 𝑧 𝑑 𝑁  𝑑𝑠 
Human capital mode 
l 𝜏 1 𝑑 𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑁 ℎ𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑠 𝑧 𝑑 𝑁 ℎ𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑠 
(2.4) 
considering the following expression as the labor demand in the human capital 
model: 
  𝐿 1 𝑑𝑡 𝑢 𝑁 ℎ  
(2.5) 
Consequently, the previous budget constraints can be simplified as follows. 
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𝐿 𝑑𝑠 𝑅 𝛿 𝐾  (2.7) 
In such a way that, neither tax rate nor the unemployment subsidy appear in the 
expressions. 
The labor supply expressions can be obtained from the solution to the decision 





1 𝑑 𝑤  (2.8) 




Human capital model 









for all services s. 

















where 𝑁  corresponds to services maintaining the wage and 𝑁  to those who 
revise it. 
Intermediate	good	firms	
The behavior of intermediate good firms is different, depending on the model. 
Schumpeterian model 
As in the first chapter, monopolistically competitive firms obtain intermediate 
goods through a simple technology that generates one unit of a given intermediate 
good from one unit of final output. The profit for the firm producing intermediate 
good i will be: 
Fit	=	Pitxit	−	Ptxit	 (2.12) 




They sell their output to final goods firms and set the prices according to Taylor 
contracts for I periods. 
Human capital model  
Intermediate goods producers are indexed by j ∈ [0, 1] and have a Cobb–Douglas 
production function: 
𝑌 𝐴𝐾 𝐿  (2.13) 
where 𝑌  is the output of the intermediate good j, A is total factor productivity, Kjt 
is physical capital stock, and Ljt a composite index of differentiated labor services 
𝐿 𝐿  𝑑𝑠 . 

















𝑑  (2.16) 
Considering expression 2.5 and those of N	(2.10 and 2.11) and u (Appendix B.1), 
we can obtain the employment rate for each value of 𝑁  and 𝑢  with sticky wages: 
𝐿 1 𝑑 𝑢 𝑁  




𝐿 1 𝑑 𝑢 𝑁  
Retail	firms	or	final	goods	producers 
Schumpeterian model	
According to Aghion and Howitt (1992), final goods production function is the 
following: 
Y 𝐿 𝐴 𝑥 𝑑  (2.18) 
where xit  is the amount of intermediate good i  used at t , 0 < α <  1, Lt  is the 
composite demand of labor services and Ait is the productivity of intermediate 
good i (quality level).  
The demand function for labor service s is obtained from profit maximization: 




Considering that labor supply is not equal to labor demand, integrating 𝐿  we 
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Additionally, we obtain the expression of the partial labor demand for each value 






The expression of unemployment rate is obtained from the difference of labor 









Human capital model 
There are an infinite number of retail firms over the continuum [0,1], which 
repackage the homogeneous intermediate goods and sell them to households 
according to the demand function: 
 𝑌 𝑌 𝑑𝑟                      r ∈ 0,1  
They sell their goods to households and set the price according to Taylor contracts 




This model displays Schumpeterian growth because it occurs by increasing the 
quality of intermediate goods, and by “quality” we must understand the 




As it has been explained in the previous chapter, on the basis of the good 
producers’ profit function and the expected profits, if innovation is successful, we 








1 𝛾 1 1 (2.24) 
Human capital model 
The growth process in human capital model is obtained from the solution of the 
dynamic optimization problem recorded in Appendix B.1, which establishes these 
conditions in steady state: 








⎧ 1 𝜉 1 𝑢 1 𝑑 𝑁 𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐹𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
1 𝜉 1 𝑢 1 𝑑 𝑁 1 𝑔 ℎ
1 𝜉 1 𝑢 1 𝑑 𝑁 1 𝑔 ℎ
1 𝜉 1 𝑢 1 𝑑 𝑁 1 𝑔 ℎ 1 𝐽   𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦
 (2.26) 
where uss y Nss are steady-state values with wage flexibility, while u1 , h1 and N1 are 
the decisions for labor services with constant nominal wage for s∈ 0, J 2 ,  u01 , 
h01 and N1 for s∈ J 2, J 2 , and u0, h0	and N0 for s∈ J 1, J 1  the labor 







2.2.3 	Unemployment	 and	wage	 stickiness:	 efficiency	wages	 and	
staggered	contracts	
The labor market friction introduced by the existence of efficiency wages involves 
incentive problems: asymmetric information, moral hazard and adverse selection. 
The main implication of this theory is a lower labor demand than labor supply and, 
consequently, the existence of unemployment, which works as a discipline 
mechanism for the workers and generates inefficiencies in resource allocation, 
according to Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984).  
Employees choose between two effort levels (0,1), with 0 being the real cost of not 
making and effort and e the cost of doing so. However, if an employee shirks work 
tasks (effort 0), there is a probability q of being caught and being dismissed. 
If we consider wage flexibility, workers’ employment discounted present value 
(DPV) depends on the strategy about shirking or complying. The following 





N =w-e+ b (VU-VE
N ) 
rVU = z + a(VE -VU ) 
(2.27) 
Where  VE
S represents the DPV of employment for the worker that shirks, VE
N the 
DPV for the worker that does not shirk and, finally, VU that of the unemployed. In 
addition, r is interest rate, b the probability rate of employment loss, q	 the 
probability of being caught and being fired, a the rate of job-finding and z the 




Consequently, the employers will set a wage consistent with workers incentives, 
that is, a wage ensuring workers will make the effort instead of shirking. This wage 
















where N is labor force, L employment and d unemployment rate. From this 
expression, we can deduce that a higher  , that is, a lower level of 
unemployment, requires a higher wage in order to satisfy the no shirking 
condition. Therefore, unemployment acts as a discipline mechanism. 
If we consider quarterly data and wage stickiness during four periods according to 
Taylor staggering wage-setting process, the average values of workers 












𝑧∆ 𝑎∆ 𝑉 𝑉  
(2.29) 
The variable w is the steady wage value set in every revision. In order to obtain 
this wage value, we need the expressions of the different parameters △  that 
represent the cumulative probabilities of being employed or unemployed: 
△ 1 1 𝑏 1 𝑏 1 𝑏  
△ 1 1 𝑞 1 𝑞 1 𝑞  





The parameter △  contains the four probabilities of being employed due to 
structural reasons, the parameter △ the four probabilities of being employed 
despite shirking, and the parameter △  the four probabilities of being unemployed 
also for structural reasons.  
The parameter △  contains the four coefficients differencing the steady wage w 
after each revision from the other three possible values of steady wages that 
coincide simultaneously each quarter in the case of workers that shirk. This 
parameter is also different in the two models. 
Schumpeterian model 
△ 1
1 𝑏 1 𝑞
Π𝑔
1 𝑏 1 𝑞
Π𝑔




Human capital model 
△ 1
1 𝑏 1 𝑞
Π
1 𝑏 1 𝑞
Π




The parameter △  contains the four coefficients differencing the four possible 
values of steady net wages that coincide simultaneously each quarter in the case of 






















The three arbitrage conditions for every DPV can be rewritten as follows: 
4𝑟 𝑏∆ 𝑞∆ 𝑉 𝑤∆ 𝑏∆ 𝑞∆ 𝑉  
4𝑟 𝑏∆ 𝑉 𝑤∆ 𝑒∆ 𝑏∆ 𝑉  
4𝑟 𝑎∆ 𝑉 𝑧∆ 𝑎∆ 𝑉  
Taking into account as the point of departure the condition of consistency with 
workers incentives: 
𝑉
𝑤∆ 𝑏∆ 𝑞∆ 𝑉
4𝑟 𝑏∆ 𝑞∆
𝑤∆ 𝑒∆ 𝑏∆ 𝑉
4𝑟 𝑏∆
𝑉  





































𝑤 ∆ 4𝑟 𝑏∆ ∆ 4𝑟 𝑏∆ 𝑞∆












4𝑟 𝑎∆ 𝑏∆ 𝑧∆
∆ 4𝑟 𝑏∆ 𝑞∆
𝑞∆ 𝑎∆
4𝑟 𝑎∆ 𝑏∆ ∆ 4𝑟 𝑏∆
(2.35) 
In the case of wage flexibility, we have△ △ △ △ △ 1, and the 
expression of w is simplified. The flexible steady wage would take the following 
expression: 
𝑤
𝑒 𝑟 𝑏 𝑞
𝑟𝑞𝑎
𝑟 𝑟 𝑎 𝑏
𝑞 𝑟 𝑏
𝑟 𝑎 𝑏 𝑧




From where, after some algebra, we obtain the well-known expression of the 
efficiency wage introduced initially (2.28): 
𝑤




𝑟 𝑎 𝑏 𝑧
𝑟 𝑏 𝑞 𝑟 𝑏
𝑞𝑎
𝑟 𝑎 𝑏
𝑒 𝑟 𝑏 𝑟 𝑎 𝑏 𝑞 𝑟 𝑎 𝑏 𝑞𝑎 𝑞 𝑟 𝑏 𝑧
𝑞 𝑟 𝑎 𝑏 𝑞𝑎


















As explained in Chapter 1, it is intermediate goods producers who set every I 
period (quarters) the price  𝑃∗ that maximizes their expected profits, which will be 









Human capital model 
It is the retail firms who set, for the I periods, the price that maximizes their 
expected profits in that time interval. The optimal relative price in steady state will 
be: 











As described in Chapter 1, the aggregate equilibrium of the good markets is the 
equality between final output and the sum of consumption and gross investment. 
We again consider that there are neither public expenditures nor an external 
sector and the demand for final goods is composed of consumption, investment in 
R&D, and intermediate goods production. As a result, the ratio 




































Human capital model 
We again assume, also as in Chapter 1, that there are neither public expenditures 
nor an external sector. Therefore, final good output is composed of consumption 
and investment, and the steady-state consumption to physical capital ratio in 









𝑔 𝐶 𝛿 (2.41)




We must characterize the steady state and the system of equations that 
determine the values of the endogenous variables in this situation, considering 
that our models incorporate economic growth and, therefore, the growing steady-
state variables must be normalized.  
Schumpeterian model 
The normalization of all the growing variables of the Schumpeterian model is 








,	𝑔,	𝐿	,	𝐿 ,	𝐿𝐿, ∆ ,	𝑤,	 , 𝑁 , 𝑁, 𝑑, , 		and	𝑅.	
Human capital model 
Considering the representative household’s optimal control problem of human 
capital model developed in Appendix B1, the steady-state system of equations for 
flexible wages is defined for the endogenous variables: 𝑤, 𝑤 , ∆ , 𝑅, 𝐶 𝐾⁄ , 𝑔, 𝑁 , 
𝑢 , 𝑃∗ 𝑃⁄ , Δ , 𝑅, , 𝐿𝐿  and 𝑑 . If there is wage stickiness, the equations system 
contains the following unknowns: 𝑤, 𝑤 , ∆ ,𝐶 𝐾⁄ , 𝑔, 𝑁 , 𝑁 , 𝑁, 𝑢 , 𝑢 , 𝑢 , 𝑃∗ 𝑃,⁄   
𝑃∗ 𝑃⁄ , ∆ , 𝑅, 𝐿 , 𝐿 , 𝐿 , 𝐿𝐿 and 𝑑. We present the system of equations in Appendix 
B2.2. 
 
 Trend	 inflation	 influence	 on	 unemployment,	 employment	
and	labor	force	participation	rates		
As we have done in the first chapter, the two models have been simulated through 
Dynare in order to obtain the values of the main endogenous variables in steady 
state and their responses to changes in trend inflation. Given the changes 
introduced in the setup of the models, we will pay special attention to the role 
played by unemployment, employment and labor force participation rates in the 
relationship between trend inflation and long-run growth, and the differences 
with the conclusions of the first chapter in this relationship. 
The values of the parameters used in the simulations are presented in Table 2.1.	
They are appropriate for quarterly data and, excluding the specific parameters of 




to efficiency wage parameters, in this section we use a combination of values 
(z=0.2,	 e=0.05,	 q=0.9	 and	 b=0.1) for the Schumpeterian model and (z=0.49,	
e=0.0756,	 q=0.9	 and	 b=0.6) for the Lucas human capital model. These 
combinations lead to a set of consequences, which, although they are not unique, 
allow us the presentation of all the possibilities that will be completely explained 




The long-term inflation−growth relationship for the parameters of Table 2.1 is 
very similar to that obtained in Chapter 1. Figure 2.1 shows how the growth rate 
remains constant at a value near 0.514% whatever the value of the trend inflation 
rate in the case of flexibility or only price stickiness. Similarly, under wage 
stickiness, growth is maximized for a negative trend inflation rate near -0.512%, 
reaching a value somewhat lower than under flexibility (0.512%). Consequently, 
we can maintain all the conclusions of Chapter 1 regarding the long-term 
inflation−growth relationship, except the coincidence of the value of the 
maximum growth rate achievable with wage stickiness and wage flexibility. 
Table	2.1: Parameter values chosen 
Parameter Description Schumpeterian 
model 
Human capital model 
𝛿 Capital depreciation rate  0.0275 
𝛼 Output elasticity with respect to capital 0.332 0.332 
𝛽 Utility discount factor 0.97 0.97 
𝜀 Elasticity of substitution among retail or 
intermediate goods 
 5 








This difference implies that we verify for this combination of parameters (z,	e,	q,	b)	
the existence of a “growth loss” when wages are sticky as a consequence of the 
presence of the unemployment originated by the friction introduced by efficiency 
wages. It will be interesting below to discover the mechanism at work in the origin 
of this loss; at the same time we show that the growth loss is not the only possible 
result because the possibilities of “no growth loss” or a “growth premium” are also 
open. 
𝜎 Elasticity of substitution among labor 
services 
12 12 
𝜈 Relative utility weight of labor 1 1 
I Periods it takes to reset prices (1, 2) (1, 2) 
J Periods it takes to reset wages (1, 4) (1, 4) 
 Productivity upgrade after every 
innovation 
1.009  
𝜒 Elasticity of the probability of success in 
the innovation with respect to relative 
investment  
0.1  
𝜉 Productivity parameter of human capital 
accumulation 
 0.07 
A  Constant total factor productivity  1 
z  Utility of leisure time and unemployment 
benefits 
0.2 0.49 
e  Cost of labor effort 0.05 0.075 
q  Probability of being fired after shirking 0.9 0.9 





Figure	2.1:	Long-term inflation-growth relationship − Schumpeterian growth model.	
 
The relationship between inflation and unemployment, employment and labor 
force participation rates are shown in Figures 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4, respectively. As in 
the previous chapter, rates with flexibility remain constant whatever the value of 
trend inflation and these rates slightly vary when only price stickiness exists 
(flexibility relationships are represented as the blue line while the red line 
corresponds to stickiness). 
Regarding wage stickiness, we must consider the three rates separately since they 
show a different behavior. Concerning unemployment rate (Figure 2.2), this does 
not change with trend inflation even in the case of wage stickiness. Consequently, 
we can confirm that unemployment rate is not a relevant variable in the long-term 
relationship between inflation and growth, since long-term unemployment is 
independent from trend inflation. This is a common feature of wage and price 
flexibility and wage stickiness, confirming Friedman’s revision of the Phillips 
curve. The specific mechanism derived from the role played by the unemployment 



























related to flexibility occurs In Section 5 we show that, when unemployment rate is 
lower in the case of stickiness, a “growth premium” occurs or, when it is the same 
in stickiness and flexibility, the “no growth loss” possibility appears (as in Chapter 
1). 
 
Figure	2.2: Long-term inflation−unemployment relationship − Schumpeterian growth model. 
 
If we pay attention to the long-term relationships inflation−labor force 
participation and inflation−employment, displayed in Figures 2.3 and 2.4, 
respectively, we can observe again independence in the case of price and wage 
flexibility and an inverted U-shape in the case of wage stickiness with the 
maximum value for these two relevant rates of the labor market at exactly the 
same trend inflation rate value that maximizes long-run growth (-0.512%). This 
result means, as a consequence, that the dynamics of these two rates contribute, 
and are closely related, to the long-run growth maximization with wage stickiness. 
The two rates reach their highest value for this trend inflation rate value due to the 





























(expression 2.24) and to the combination of the four different wages, the 
consumption and the unemployment rate at that point that provide the maximum 
average labor force participation rate. 
 Figure	2.3:	Long-term inflation-LFP relationship − Schumpeterian growth model. 
 
Moreover, for the efficiency wage parameters chosen, both employment and LFP 
rates reach—at most—a lower value when wages are sticky than when they are 
flexible at the point where both rates are maximized. However, higher or the same 
values cannot be discarded because they appear when there is “growth premium” 
or “no growth loss.” 
We can see, comparing Figures 2.3 and 2.4, that the difference between flexibility 
and wage stickiness is  greater in the employment rate than in the labor force 
participation rate, this difference being the reason for the greater unemployment 























Figure	2.4:	Long-term inflation−employment relationship − Schumpeterian growth model. 
	
2.3.2 Human	capital	model	
If we consider wages-per-unit of human capital, Figure 2.5 shows the relationship 
between economic growth and trend inflation in the long term. The blue line 
represents the case of wage and price flexibility, where the growth rate remains 
constant at a value of 0.83% whatever the inflation rate. The red line represents 
the case of wage stickiness, where the growth rate is maximized for null trend 
inflation reaching a value lower than flexibility (0.5466%). Consequently, we can 
also maintain the conclusions of Chapter 1 regarding the human capital model 
except for the coincidence of the maximum growth rate value achievable with 
wage stickiness and wage flexibility. The “growth loss” occurring in the 
Schumpeterian model with unemployment (when sticky wages are per hour or per 
worker) is also confirmed in the case of wages-per-unit of human capital. The 
mechanism is the same, depending on the relative unemployment rate values 
corresponding to wage stickiness and flexibility and, consequently, it is one of the 

























loss.” The difference in the case of the human capital model is that the position of 
the unemployment rate values is the opposite to those in the Schumpeterian model 
because the “growth loss” corresponds to a greater unemployment rate for the 
wage flexibility situation, while the “growth premium” corresponds to a lower one. 
 
Figure	2.5:	Long-term inflation−growth relationship − Human capital growth model. 
 
The following charts, Figures 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8, show the relationships between 
inflation and unemployment, employment and labor force participation rates. As 
expected, these three labor market rates remain constant whatever the value of 
trend inflation with wage and price flexibility (blue line in the charts). 
In the case of wage stickiness, each variable must also be considered separately. 
Regarding the unemployment rate (Figure 2.6), this remains unchanged after 
changes in trend inflation. Consequently, we can again confirm that unemployment 
rate is not a relevant variable in the maximization of long-term growth and also 
the validity of the revision made by Friedman to the Phillips curve in the case of 




























Figure	2.6:	Long-term inflation−unemployment relationship − Human capital growth model. 
 
With regard to employment and labor force participation rates, we can observe 
their relationships with trend inflation in Figures 2.7 and 2.8, respectively. The two 
rates reach their maximum value for null trend inflation, the same value for which 
economic growth is maximized. Consequently, as in the Schumpeterian model, 
these two variables contribute, and are closely related, to the maximization of 
long-run economic growth, unlike unemployment rate.  
The reason why these two important labor market rates are maximized for the 
same trend inflation rate value that maximizes the growth rate is much clearer 
than in the Schumpeterian model. For that trend inflation rate value, the real 
average wage reaches its minimum and, hence, the employment rate its maximum. 
In the case of the LFP rate, as it depends positively on the growth rate, the 
maximum for both rates are coincident. 
Moreover, both rates reach—at most—a lower value than with flexibility because 




























according to expressions (2.10) and (2.11). These results have significant 
consequences because the lower labor force participation rate with wage 
stickiness results in a lower unemployment rate, unlike in the Schumpeterian 
model. The underlying cause of the higher unemployment rate is a relatively 
higher LFP encouraged by the human capital accumulation. In any case we can 
conclude that a lower unemployment rate does not necessarily involve a higher 
long-term economic growth. 
	
Figure	2.7:	Long-term inflation−LFP relationship − Human capital growth model. 
 
We can see, comparing Figures 2.7 and 2.8, that the difference between flexibility 
and wage stickiness is greater in the labor force participation rate than in the 
employment rate, this difference being the reason for the lower unemployment 























Figure	2.8:	Long-term inflation−employment relationship − Human capital growth model. 
 
Finally, as in the previous chapter, we also find a sharp difference in the magnitude 
of the effect of trend inflation on long-run growth and labor market variables 
between the two models. We can continue maintaining a higher influence of 
monetary policy on long-run growth and the labor market variables when wages 
are set per unit of human capital.  
 
 Effects	of	 considering	 labor	market	 stickiness	on	maximum	
growth	rate:	transmission	mechanisms	
Having evaluated and compared through simulations the consequences of a labor 
market friction (efficiency wages) on the long-run relationships between 
inflation, labor market variables and growth, it is necessary to identify from the 
steady-state equations (Appendix B.2) the main mechanisms that explain these 

























One of the main results is the value of trend inflation that maximizes the long-
term growth rate in each model. This was the focus of the previous chapter and 
adequately explained there. In spite of the different labor market context, the 
same conclusions can be maintained in this chapter. According to this new 
context of efficiency wages, real average wage is minimum (and growth rate 
maximum) when (negative) trend inflation has exactly the same absolute value as 
the growth rate in the Schumpeterian model and for null trend inflation in the 
Lucas  human capital model due to the effect of the average real wage on labor 
demand and growth. Consequently, the previous chapter results and conclusions 
regarding this point can be maintained.  














0.514% 87.60% 86.94% 0.76% 
Wage Stickiness (*) 0.512%  84.08% 
Human	Capital	
Model	
Wage Flexibility 0.8288% 51.92% 40.08% 22.8% 
Wage Stickiness (**) 0.5466% 43.99% 36.18% 17.75% 
 Trend inflation rate 0.512% 
 Trend inflation rate 0% 
But not all the results coincide because the unemployment originated by the 
friction introduced is the cause of a growth loss when wages are sticky. A second 
significant result is that the economic growth rate with sticky wages does not 
reach the value of wage flexibility. The transmission mechanisms of the two 
models were explained in section 5 of the previous chapter and, accordingly, both 
growth rates are maximized for the minimum value of the average real wage (∆ ). 
According to B2.1.3, the effect of the average real wage on growth rate takes place 




is direct in the Lucas human capital model according to B.2.2.5. Consequently, if 
the maximum growth rate achievable with sticky wages does not reach the value 
of wage flexibility this is due to a higher average real wage value for the trend 
inflation that maximizes growth, unlike Chapter 1. The introduction of the labor 
market friction involves a different labor market context (efficiency wages), 
which results in a higher average real wage than in flexibility, due to the effect of 
the different cumulative crossed quarterly probabilities. 
The third relevant result, which is different in the two growth engines, is that the 
value of unemployment rate when wages are sticky is greater than in flexibility in 
the Schumpeterian model, while in the human capital model it is lower. The 
different transmission mechanisms were advanced in the previous section.  
Considering the Schumpeterian model, the higher average real wage with wage 
stickiness affects the employment rate both directly and negatively (B2.1.4), and 
the labor force participation rate positively, since the slightly higher consumption 
is offset by the higher average real wage (B2.2.10), increasing, as a consequence, 
the unemployment rate (B2.2.12).  
Regarding the human capital model, the higher average real wage directly 
involves a lower growth rate and, then, a lower labor force participation rate 
(B2.2.6 and B2.2.7). The lower labor force participation rate decreases the 
unemployment rate (B.2.20) because the negative effect on the employment rate 
is offset (B2.2.19). Consequently, while the labor force participation rate 
decreases, the employment rate decreases to a lesser extent and, therefore, 




As a result of these transmission mechanisms, while unemployment rate with 
wage stickiness is higher than with flexibility in the Schumpeterian model, it is 
lower in the human capital model. Here again, the ultimate reason is the different 
ways of setting wages and the mechanism to determine the employment rate. 
 
 A	sensitivity	analysis	for	efficiency	wage	parameters	
A sensitivity analysis of the main macroeconomic variables to changes in efficiency 
wage parameters is the way to display the possibilities opened for the two growth 
models in the two wage-setting alternatives considered. Figures 2.9 and 2.10, 
which show the results for this analysis in the two models, summarize these 
possibilities and will be referred to throughout this section. 
As a conclusion of this analysis, we seek to be able to determine the values of the 
efficiency wage parameters consistent with the charts presented in the previous 
section and the reasons to discard other alternatives. 
It is important to say that, while in the case of flexibility the simulations are 
independent of the trend inflation rate, with wage stickiness the simulations are 
made for the value -0.512, for which the growth rate is maximized with the 
combination (z=0.2, e=0.05, q=0.9, b=0.1) in the Schumpeterian model and 0 with 
the combination (z=0.49, e=0.075, q=0.9, b=0.6) in the Lucas human capital model. 
Moreover, when the sensibility for one of the four parameters is studied the other 
three are maintained in the values of the combination of Table 2.1. 
There are two features of the results that are present in almost all the cases 
considered below. The first is that the sensibility of the real wage to all the 




wage stickiness, except in the case of the probability of employment loss 
(parameter b). In fact, the response of the main variables in the case of stickiness is 
almost negligible. The reason for this is the absence of wage revision for some of 
the workers and the crossed influence on this variable originated by the 
probabilities of losing employment (b	and q).  
The second feature is that, fortunately, the real wage response to changes in the 
parameters is the same in the two models, even though in the first case LFP and 
the employment rate depend on the real wage while in the case of the Lucas model 
they depend on the growth rate. 
 
2.5.1 Schumpeterian	model	
Figure 2.9 shows the response of growth, employment, LFP and unemployment 
rates in the Schumpeterian model to changes in the parameters z	(Figure 2.9a), e	
(Figure 2.9b), q	 (Figure 2.9c) and in b	 (Figure 2.9d). In order to perform this 
analysis, we must bear in mind expressions (2.8) for LFP rate, (2.22) for 
employment rate, (2.35) and (2.36) for efficiency wages and (2.24) for economic 
growth. 
Variations in z 
The growth rate with flexibility is higher than that of stickiness until the value 0.6 
for z, and lower for z greater than 0.6. The same can be said for LFP and the 
employment rate and the opposite for the unemployment rate.  
 Under wage flexibility, for values lower than 0.6 efficiency wages increase 




growth. The value of the average real wage is lower than that 
corresponding to wage stickiness. The labor force participation rate is not 
affected since the increase of efficiency wages is compensated by higher 
consumption. As a consequence, unemployment rate slightly increases with 
the decrease of employment rate. For values greater than 0.6 the impact is 
higher. 
 Under wage stickiness, the effect of z in efficiency wages is negligible due to 
the fixed value of the trend inflation rate, its positive influence is 
compensated by the lack of wage revision for some workers and the 
crossed influence of the probabilities of losing employment. 
 






































































































































 The reason why the real wage is greater with stickiness than with flexibility 
is the greater unemployment rate and the crossed effects of the 
probabilities of staying employed. 
 What is the meaning of the threshold? The meaning is that, in this model, 
the utility of leisure time and unemployment benefits has an intense effect 
on the flexible average real wage, especially from 0.6. This wage grows with 
z, for z=0.6 is equal to the sticky wage and from 0.6 becomes greater and 
greater. 
The charts previously presented (Figures 2.1 to 2.4) are correct for values of z 
lower than 0.6. For 0.6 the maximum values of growth, employment and LFP rates 
of stickiness will be the same as in flexibility, like the constant unemployment rate. 
For values greater than 0.6 the maximum values of growth, employment and LFP 
rates of stickiness will be greater than those corresponding to flexibility and the 
constant unemployment rate will be lower. Values lower than 0.6 are the most 
likely because this value corresponds to 80% of the wage. As the proportion grows 
with z, values greater than 0.6 are not plausible. 
Variations in e 
As for parameter z, there is an upper limit at the value 0.15 for parameter e from 
where stickiness growth turns higher than that of flexibility. For lower values of e, 
the wage rate is lower with flexibility than with stickiness, which is also like that of 
parameter z, and the opposite happens for values greater than 0.15.  
 Under wage flexibility, efficiency wages increase with e, decreasing 




LFP rate is not affected as in the case of z because the rise in consumption 
compensates the increase of efficiency wages. 
 Contrary to flexibility, sticky efficiency wages slightly change due to the 
constant value of the trend inflation rate, the lack of revision with growth 
rate in no updated wages, and the crossed effects of the probabilities of 
staying employed. Consequently, both employment and growth rates 
slightly grow with e. 
As a conclusion, the charts previously presented (Figures 2.1 to 2.4) are correct for 
values of e lower than 0.15. For 0.15 the maximum values of growth, employment 
and LFP rates of stickiness will be the same as in flexibility, like the constant 
unemployment rate. For values greater than 0.15, the maximum values of growth, 
employment and LFP rates of stickiness will be greater than those corresponding 


















Figure	2.9b: Schumpeterian model: Sensitivity of the main economic rates to changes in parameter  
	













































































































































Once again, the most likely values are lower than 0.15 because e is 20% of the 
wage and the proportion is increasing with e. 
Variations in q 
Unlike parameters z and e, there is a minimum threshold of q from which growth 
of flexibility exceeds the stickiness value. This value is exactly 0.25. 
 Flexible efficiency wages decrease with q increasing employment and 
growth rates and decreasing unemployment rate. LFP rate is minimally 




Figure	2.9c:	Schumpeterian model: Sensitivity of the main economic rates to changes in parameter q. 
 
 
 The effect on sticky efficiency wages is very low because of the effect of the 






























































































































































































decline in the probability of being employed (△  and △ ). Consequently, 
employment rate slightly increases with the minimum drop in efficiency 
wages but the effect on economic growth is negligible. 
 
In conclusion, for values of q smaller than 0.25, the flexible wage is higher than 
that of stickiness and then flexibility growth is smaller than the growth of 
stickiness. The charts previously presented (Figures 2.1 to 2.4) are correct for 
values of z greater than 0.25. For 0.25 the maximum values of growth, employment 
and LFP rates of stickiness will be the same as in flexibility, like the constant 
unemployment rate. For values greater than 0.25, the maximum values of growth, 
employment and LFP rates of stickiness will be lower than those corresponding to 
flexibility and the constant unemployment rate will be higher. In this case the most 
plausible values are greater than 0.25. 
Variations in b 
Flexibility growth rate is higher than that of stickiness until the value 0.9 for b. The 
same can be said for employment and LFP rates and the opposite for the 































































Figure	2.9d:	Schumpeterian model: Sensitivity of the main economic rates to changes in parameter 
b.	
 
 Flexible real wages grow with b, which decreases employment and	growth 
rates and increases unemployment rate. The effect on LFP is low, since the 
increase in efficiency wages is partly compensated by higher consumption. 
 Under stickiness, efficiency wages grow with b to a greater extent than 
flexible wages due to the negative effect of △  on efficiency wages until 0.9. 
The effect on LFP is also negligible. 
As a result, flexibility growth is higher than that of stickiness and this difference 
becomes greater as b increases until 0.9. Regarding unemployment rate, the 
flexible rate is lower and the difference becomes greater as b grows until 0.9.  
The charts previously presented (Figures 2.1 to 2.4) are correct for values of b 
lower than 0.9. For 0.9 the maximum values of growth, employment and LFP rates 
of stickiness will be the same as in flexibility, like the constant unemployment rate. 
For values greater than 0.9, the maximum values of growth, employment and LFP 
rates of stickiness will be greater than those corresponding to flexibility and the 
constant unemployment rate will be lower. Obviously, the most plausible values 














































Figure 2.10 shows the sensitivity of growth, employment, labor force participation 
and unemployment rates in the human capital model to variations in z, e, q and b. 
In order to perform this analysis, we must bear in mind expressions (2.9) to (2.11) 
for the LFP rate, (2.14) and (2.17) for the employment rate, (2.35) and (2.36) for 
efficiency wages and (B2.2.5) for the growth rate. 
 
Variations in z 
The growth rate with flexibility is higher than that of stickiness until the value 0.6 
for z, and lower for z when it is greater than 0.6. The same can be said for LFP, 
employment and unemployment rates.  
 When z=0, the difference of the growth rate is highest between flexibility 
and stickiness. However, under flexibility, economic growth rate decreases 
with z and does the LFP rate. In addition, it boosts real wage and, thus, 
employment rate decreases. The effect on unemployment rate (function 
2.17) is the same because of the higher effect on the LFP rate than in 
employment rate.  
 Under stickiness, the effect on the uploaded wage is offset by the lack of 
revision with the growth rate and the crossed effects of the probabilities of 








Figure	2.10a: Lucas model: Sensitivity of the main economic rates to changes in parameter z. 
 
The charts previously presented (Figures 2.5 to 2.8) are correct for values of z 
lower than 0.6. For 0.6 the maximum values of growth, employment and LFP rates 
of stickiness will be the same as in flexibility, like the constant unemployment rate. 
For values greater than 0.6 the maximum values of growth, employment, LFP and 
unemployment rates of stickiness will be greater than those corresponding to 
flexibility. The first situation is the most plausible one. 
Variations in e 
There is no minimum threshold of e from which flexibility growth exceeds the 
growth of stickiness, at least initially. It is greater whatever the value of e, like the 






















































































































































Figure	2.10b: Lucas model: Sensitivity of main economic rates to changes in parameter e.	
 
 Under wage flexibility, economic growth decreases with e, because LFP, 
employment and unemployment rates decrease as a response to the 
subsequent increase in the real wage.  
 Similar to parameter z, under stickiness the effect on efficiency wages is 
offset by the lack of revision for three quarters of the workers and the 
crossed effects of the probabilities of staying employed, making negligible 
the net variation. 
 A singular result in this case is that for e greater than 0.30 the 
unemployment rate is negative, implying the impossibility of feasible 
equilibria for higher values of e.   
The charts previously presented (Figures 2.5 to 2.8) are correct for any feasible 







































































































































Variations in q 
There is not a lower limit of q where flexibility growth turns higher than that of 
stickiness. The growth with wage flexibility exceeds the growth of wage stickiness 





Figure	2.10c: Lucas model: Sensitivity of main economic rates to changes in parameter q. 
 
Variations in b 
Similar to parameter q in the Schumpeterian model, there is a minimum threshold 
of b from which the growth rate of flexibility exceeds that of stickiness. This value 











































































































































 Wage flexibility erodes economic growth, LFP, employment and 
unemployment rates as b grows, because the real wage increases.   
 The same happens with wage stickiness but the drop in the quoted rates is 




Figure	2.10d: Lucas model: Sensitivity of main economic rates to changes in parameter b.	
 
The charts previously presented (Figures 2.5 to 2.8) are correct for values of b 
greater than 0.54. For 0.54 the maximum values of growth, employment and LFP 
rates of stickiness will be the same as in flexibility, like the constant 
unemployment rate. For values lower than 0.54, the maximum values of growth, 
employment, LFP and unemployment rates of stickiness will be greater than those 
corresponding to flexibility. 
We can clearly observe in Table 2.3 the same conditions in the two models for 











































































































































spite of the	different conditions in the last case, the limits of the two models are 
fully compatible. Related to parameter q, there are no conditions in the human 
capital model, while the condition in the Schumpeterian model is very plausible.  
Table	2.3: Threshold values for growth rate with wage flexibility higher than in wage stickiness 
Model	 Parameter	z	 Parameter	e	 Parameter	q	 Parameter	b	
Schumpeterian		 <0.60 < 0.15 > 0.25 <0.9 
Human	Capital	 <0.60 < 0.3  > 0.54 
       < 0.9 
 
From all the possibilities of parameter combinations contained in Table 2.3, the 
more likely combinations of efficiency wage parameters in the two models are 
those leading to a “growth loss.”  
 
 Conclusions	
Two DSGE models with endogenous growth and nominal stickiness have been 
extended to include the presence of unemployment in order to know its effects on 
the relationship “trend inflation/long-run growth” and how it affects the 
conclusions of the first chapter. The main results on these effects, as well as the 
implications on other very relevant macroeconomic variables, have been obtained 
from simulations using Dynare. 
We have concluded firstly that the introduction of unemployment does not affect 
the relationship between trend inflation and long-run growth in its basic features, 
since their general structure is similar to that shown in Chapter 1. However, those 




between trend inflation and the new endogenous variables of the labor market 
introduced allow us, secondly, to find some results assigning a key role for two of 
those variables in the long-term transmission mechanisms of the monetary policy. 
They are employment and labor force participation rates.  
Our results confirm that, as in Friedman’s critique of the Phillips curve, trend 
inflation and the unemployment rate are independent in the long run but, at the 
same time, employment and labor force participation rates are maximized for the 
value of the trend inflation, which maximizes the long-run growth rate.  
Consequently, maintaining  the Friedman criticism after having introduced 
additional endogenous variables and a distortion in the labor market, we 
simultaneously find additional results that provide a more general perspective for 
the long-run macroeconomic dynamics. In particular, these results mean that the 
trend inflation rate value for which the natural rate of unemployment takes place 
is not indifferent because it is associated to different growth, employment, and 
labor force participation rates, the same trend inflation rate maximizing the three 
rates. 
 Therefore, the point here is the new macroeconomic relevance of employment and 
labor force participation rates, which play a decisive role in the mechanisms that 
make it possible for monetary policy to reach the maximum achievable economic 
growth rate. As these two variables do not play any theoretical role in mainstream 
macroeconomic models, this result could mean that the preconceived notion 
maintaining that unemployment rate is the labor market variable playing the key 




Moreover, the new labor market context (efficiency wages) has relevant 
additional consequences. While unemployment rate with wage stickiness is 
higher than that of flexibility in the Schumpeterian model, we find the opposite in 
the human capital model. But the more remarkable result is that, unlike in 
Chapter 1,  sticky average real wage can be higher, equal or lower than a flexible 
wage, and the value of the achievable growth rate will be respectively lower, 
equal or higher with wage stickiness than with wage flexibility. Consequently, the 
unemployment caused by the labor market distortion introduced can cause a 
“growth loss” or a “growth premium” in the case of wage stickiness, as well as a 
loss or a gain in employment and labor force participation rates. From all these 
possibilities, the more likely combinations of efficiency wage parameters in the 















Taking into consideration both unemployment and a financial sector, we present an extended long-
run inflation−growth relationship for two wage-setting processes and some of its empirical 
implications. The financial extension includes new variables, from which one of them—leverage 
ratio—plays a key role in the maximization of long-run growth. However, the negative impact of the 
financial friction (and leverage ratio) on the achievable economic growth cannot be generalized 
since it depends on the kind of friction considered. Additionally, the empirical application explores 
the implications of the models for six countries in order to identify to what extent they could 
improve their observed long-run growth, employment and labor force participation rates according 
to the obtained inflation−growth relationship.  
	
 Introduction 
The results of the two previous chapters have allowed us to know the relationships 
between trend inflation, long-run growth and labor market variables in greater 
detail, in the presence of endogenous growth, nominal price and wage stickiness 
and unemployment. They have confirmed the non-neutrality of monetary policy 
with wage stickiness, the non-generality of the results of Amano et al. (2009) and 
Amano, Carter and Moran (2012), since the optimal trend inflation depends on the 
type of wage-setting process. They have also confirmed Friedman’s critique of 
Phillips’ curve, which has been extended with the relevant role played by 
employment and labor force participation rates in the maximization of the 




Throughout this chapter, we complete our analysis with the introduction of a 
financial sector. We can find different precedents in the existing literature on the 
link between the financial system and long-run economic growth, where we are 
interested in the long-run relationship leverage ratio/growth. Up to now, the 
results in the literature appear conclusive in that there is not a relationship that is 
generally applicable to all the possible situations. 
Goldsmith (1969) was the first to consider whether financial structure influences 
the pace of economic growth. He thought that one of the most important problems 
in the field of finance, if not the single most important one, was the effect that 
financial structure and development have on economic growth. But although he 
was largely successful in documenting the evolution of national financial systems, 
he was unable to provide much cross-country evidence on the relationship 
between economic development and the mixture of financial markets, due to data 
limitations. 
Recent research has not substantially completed Goldsmith's goal of assessing the 
relationship between financial structure and economic growth in a broad cross-
section of countries. Researchers have developed rigorous theories of the 
evolution of financial structures and how the mixture of markets and banks 
influences economic development but the empirical results are mixed. 
Auerbach (1985) stated that, according to agency models of financial activity, risky 
firms should borrow less, while fast-growing firms should borrow less because of 
their higher ratio of growth opportunities to existing capital. But he found a 
positive relation between the firm growth (profit growth) and long-term leverage 




inconsistent with the predictions of "agency" models of leverage. 
Lang, Ofek and Stulz (1996) showed that leverage does not reduce growth for 
firms known to have good investment opportunities (high-q firms), but is 
negatively related to growth for firms whose growth opportunities are either not 
recognized by the capital markets or are not sufficiently valuable to overcome the 
effects of their debt overhang (low Tobin’s q ratio). 
Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine (2001) conclude in the introduction of their book that 
financial structure is not an analytically very useful way to distinguish among 
national financial systems. Countries do not grow faster, new firms are not created 
more easily, firms' access to external finance is not easier, and firms do not grow 
faster in either market- or bank-based financial systems. 
Beck et al. (2001) conduct a comprehensive assessment of the relationship 
between economic performance and financial structure. Using different data and 
econometric methodologies, the authors find astonishingly consistent results. 
First, no evidence exists that distinguishing countries by financial structure helps 
explain differences in economic performance. More precisely, countries do not 
grow faster, financially dependent industries do not expand at higher rates, new 
firms are not created more easily, firms' access to external finance is not easier, 
and firms do not grow faster in either market-based or bank-based financial 
systems. Second, they find that distinguishing countries by overall financial 
development does help explain cross-country differences in economic 
performance.  
Arestis, Luintel and Luintel (2008) take as their point of departure the previous 




structure and economic growth, revealing first that time series results show that, 
in sharp contrast to existing results, for the majority of countries financial 
structure significantly explains economic growth. Second, they find significant 
heterogeneity in cross-country parameters and adjustment dynamics, concluding 
that data cannot be pooled for the countries considered because panel regressions 
mask important cross-country differences. 
They conclude that a robust co-integrating relationship between output per capita, 
capital stock per capita and the financial structure exists, in sharp contrast to 
Levine (2002) and Beck and Levine (2002), amongst others. The main policy 
message of their findings is that financial structure matters for economic growth 
but with the effect of the leverage ratio being different depending on the countries. 
Finally, Gambacorta, Yang, Tsatsaronis (2014) maintain that, up to a point, banks 
and markets both foster economic growth. Beyond that limit, expanded bank 
lending or market-based financing no longer adds to real growth. But when it 
comes to moderating business cycle fluctuations, banks and markets differ 
considerably in their effects. In normal downturns, healthy banks help to cushion 
the shock but, when recessions have coincided with financial crises, the impact on 
GDP has been three times as severe for bank-oriented economies as it has for 
market-oriented ones. 
In short, there is no a unique relation between the leverage ratio and the growth 
rate, with any direction of the causality and even the absence of causality being 
possible when the sample pools cross-country and time series data. 
The first objective of this chapter is to know how a distortion in the financial 




into consideration that monetary policy is closely related to interest rates and, 
hence, to financial activity. The results obtained from this analysis allow us to 
confirm that the incorporation of financial frictions has not any impact on the main 
results from Chapters 1 and 2. On the other hand, the consequences of introducing 
financial frictions cannot be generalized regardless of the friction type, since we 
have found that a costly	 verification	model	has no any impact on the long-run 
inflation−growth relationship if we consider nominal stickiness in wages, unlike 
flexibility. Moreover, we confirm the previously quoted results regarding the non-
conclusive influence of the leverage ratio on the growth rate, given that the 
influence in the two models of financial friction considered the relationship 
between the two variables is contrary. 
The second objective of this third chapter is to explore the empirical implications 
of the models for six developed countries in order to conclude to what extent they 
could improve their long-run growth, employment and labor force participation 
rates. The conclusions from the Schumpeterian model are that the two countries 
with more potential increase in the long-run growth are Japan and Germany. The 
USA and France are situated at an intermediate level of improvement, while 
Australia and Spain are the two countries with the lowest level of growth gain. In 
the Lucas human capital model, France is added to the first group, Australia and 
Spain would be in the intermediate group and the USA would have the lowest 
improvement. 
The way to achieve these gains would be a change in trend inflation (inflation 
target). The one country with a positive change is Japan (+0.21%), while the rest of 




-0.76% Spain and -0.88% the USA and Australia. For these last two countries the 
gain in the employment and LFP rates would be at most one percentage point, 
three quarters of a percentage point in Spain and near zero in Japan, Germany and 
France. So, the growth gain in the first three countries would come from the 
improvement in the LFP rate, while in the case of the last three the growth gain 
would come from a change in the allocation of resources leading to an increase in 
the TFP growth. In other words, the growth gain would come from the increase in 
the TFP growth in the second group while in the first one the origin would come 
from the LFP rate. 
To address our analysis, we will continue using the two growth models analyzed in 
the previous chapter, that is, the Schumpeterian growth model of Aghion and 
Howitt and the Lucas human capital model. We start from these models as defined 
in Chapter 2 with unemployment, completing them with the specific features of the 
corresponding financial sector. 
This approach involves intermediate goods producers or retailers needing external 
resources to fund their investment in R&D or their working capital, respectively, 
because their internal funds are no longer enough But in addition to that, we will 
consider the existence of asymmetric information in the financial market. As 
mentioned, we will consider two different frictions to obtain a broader analysis, 
one in the Schumpeterian model and the second in the Lucas human capital model. 
Both frictions are based on the existence of asymmetric information. Both frictions 
are based on the existence of asymmetric information: namely, in Gertler and 
Karadi’s (2011) financial	 intermediation	 model	 the financial entities have an 




model	 of	 Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) and Gertler (2009) the 
information advantage in on the part of  the borrowers in the Lucas human capital 
mode. All their features are explained in Section 2. 
Section 3 presents the relationships between inflation, growth, labor market 
variables and leverage ratio, which confirm all the conclusions from previous 
chapters and the ambiguous results on the relationship leverage ratio/trend 
inflation, and the impact of the financial friction on long-run growth. While the 
financial	 intermediation	model shrinks economic growth, the costly	 verification	
model	barely has an impact on the level of economic growth under wage stickiness. 
Section 4 summarizes the results of section 3 and contains the assessment of the 
main effect of considering wage stickiness, unemployment and financial friction on 
the long-run growth rate. Section 5 contains the sensitivity analysis of growth rate, 
labor market variables, and leverage ratio to changes in efficiency wage 
parameters. Section 6 includes the empirical application of two models to six 
economies governed by different central banks: United States, Australia, Japan, 
France, Spain and Germany. The estimations have been made using Dynare in 
order to obtain all the parameters, and thus compare the observed with the best 





In line with the two previous chapters, we will enrich the Schumpeterian and 




market features will be introduced throughout this section and we will analyze 
how the new activity affects agents and expressions. 
In order to obtain broader conclusions, we will consider a different financial 
friction for each one of the growth models. The financial	intermediation	model of 
Gertler and Karadi (2011) has been selected to introduce the financial distortion in 
the Schumpeterian model and, the costly	 verification	 model	 of	 Bernanke and 
Gertler (1989) in the Lucas human capital model. 
As in the previous chapters, price stickiness has been considered for two periods, 
and wage stickiness for four. Similarly, efficiency wages introduce the distortion in 
the labor market causing unemployment and the expression for sticky wages has 






The financial friction model considered is based on asymmetric information in 
favor of financial entities that have more information than depositors. As a 
consequence, the latter are those who must take precautions against or impose 
restrictions on the deposits placement. The main elements used by Gertler and 
Karadi (2011) to define the financial intermediaries’ behavior are set out below. 




𝑆 𝑇 𝐵  (3.1) 
where S  represents its total credit in t, B  deposits of households and Tjt its net 
wealth or equity. The credit is demanded by the intermediate producers to found 
their investment in R&D. 
The net wealth or equity of the financial intermediary Tjt evolves as follows: 
𝑇 𝑅 𝑆 𝑅 𝐵 𝑅 𝑅 𝑆 𝑅 𝑇  (3.2) 
where Rk is credit return and R deposit cost. This agent maximizes the present 
value of their wealth V: 
𝑉 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝐸 𝛽 𝑇 max 𝐸 𝛽 𝑅 𝑅 𝑆 𝑅 𝑇  
  𝛽 being the intertemporal discount factor and taking into consideration the 
condition of the presence of financial frictions: 
𝐸 𝛽 𝑅 𝑅 0 
The agency problem entails that any financial intermediary could divert a 
proportion  of their assets, in which case depositors would obtain (1-) of theirs. 
Consequently, the compatibility of incentives would lead to the constraint: 
𝑉 𝜆 𝑆  (3.3) 
The wealth of the financial intermediary can be simplified and rewritten as 
follows: 





where 𝑣  is the marginal return of an additional unit of investment and 𝜂  the 
marginal return of an additional unit of wealth (equity). Both variables can be 
expressed as follows: 
𝑣 𝐸 𝑅 𝑅 𝐸 𝛽𝐺 𝑆 𝑣  (3.5) 











The compatibility of incentives (with equality) leads to the constraint: 
𝑣 𝑆 𝜂 𝑇 λ𝑆  (3.9) 
obtaining as a consequence the leverage ratio ∅ : 
𝑆 𝑇 ∅ 𝑇   where   ∅  (3.10)
Considering that ∅  does not depend on specific elements of each intermediary, we 
can rewrite it as follows: 𝑆 ∅  𝑇  (𝑆 ∑ 𝑆 , 𝑇 ∑ 𝑇  . Once  ∅  is known, we 












𝐺 𝑇  (3.12)




𝑇 𝛾 𝑅 𝑅 ∅ 𝑅 𝑇 𝜓𝑅 𝑆  (3.13)
where 𝜓 represents the wealth proportion of the new bankers. This expression can 
be rewritten as follows: 
𝑇 𝛾 𝑅 𝑅 ∅ 𝑅 𝑇 𝜓𝑅 ∅ 𝑇  (3.14)
𝐺 𝑇 𝛾 𝑅 𝑅 ∅ 𝑅 𝜓𝑅 ∅  (3.15)
 
Human capital model 
This model is also based on asymmetric information but, in this case, in favor of 
borrowers. This financial friction is derived from the costly	 verification	 of 
contracts, due to the existence of asymmetric information (Bernanke and Gertler, 
1989). As a result, an external finance premium appears and corporate balance 
sheets are of essential importance. We consider that the retailers are the agents 
who need to fund their working capital. They allocate the benefits of each period to 
fund the productive activity, but in addition to that, they have to resort to external 
funding to cover all the production costs. 
The minimum return on total investment of an entrepreneur i (𝑄  required by 
financial intermediaries to lend is  𝜔∗𝑅 𝑄 , where 𝑅  is the average gross return 
and 𝜔 is an idiosyncratic stochastic shock for each borrower in the interval [ 𝜔, 𝜔 ] 
with cumulative probability function H(𝜔  and probability density function h(𝜔 .  
Consequently, if 𝜔 𝜔∗ 	the lender obtains 𝐷 𝜔∗𝑅 𝑄  but if 𝜔 𝜔∗ , the 




such a way that the financial intermediary’s benefit will be 1 𝜇 𝜔𝑅 𝑄 . The 
total cost of bankruptcy is  𝜇𝜔𝑅 𝑄 .   







where we denote the second term 𝐺 𝜔∗  𝜔𝑑𝐻
∗
. 





1 𝛤 𝜔∗ 𝜇𝐺 𝜔∗ 𝑅 𝑅
𝜙 𝑅 𝑅 	 (3.17) 
where 𝐹   is the retail firms’ own financing (their period benefits) and 𝑅 the real 
interest rate on bonds. 𝜙 𝑅 𝑅  is the term denoting the leverage ratio. 
Due to all retailers having the same behavior and 𝜙 𝑅 𝑅  not depending on 
idiosyncratic aspects, we can rewrite for all the economy: 
𝑄
𝐹
𝜙 𝑅 𝑅 	
(3.18) 
where  
𝑄 𝑄 𝑑𝑖 
𝐹 𝐹 𝑑𝑖 
As a result, the gross rate of a loan in period t, 𝑅 , is: 
𝑅 𝑅 1
𝜇𝐺 𝜔∗
𝛤 𝜔∗ 𝐺 𝜔∗
	 (3.19) 
where the term 
∗






Household members offer labor to intermediate or final goods producers, 
depending on the model, consume the final good and hold bonds. Supply and 
demand for labor are no longer equal and the expected utility must take the 
following form: 
E 𝛽 log 𝐶
1
1 𝜈
𝑁 𝑑𝑠  (3.20) 
where 𝑁  represents only the supply of labor (or labor force participation) for 
labor service s with s ∈ 0,1 , while Ls will be the labor demand of the firms for 
labor service s. 
Furthermore, households must satisfy the same budget constraint as in Chapter 2 
because household members do not need funding and, then, the financial friction 








𝑅 D 1 𝑑
𝑊
𝑃
𝐿 𝑑𝑠 (3.21) 




1 𝑑 𝑤  (3.22)
where  𝑁 𝑁  𝑑𝑠. 







𝑅 D 1 𝑑
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Similarly to the Schumpeterian model, financial friction does not impact on the 
consumer decision problem and we can maintain the same expression of the 
previous chapter. 
























where N  represents the labor supply for individuals who will reset the nominal 




As explained in the first and second chapters, monopolistically competitive firms 
obtain intermediate goods through a simple technology that generates one unit of 
a given intermediate good from one unit of final output. The profit for the firm 
producing intermediate goods i will be: 
Fit	=	Pitxit	−	Ptxit	
They sell their output to final goods firms and, under price stickiness, set the prices 












Human capital model 
Intermediate goods producers are indexed by j	∈	[0,	1] and have a Cobb–Douglas 
production function: 
𝑌 𝐴𝐾 𝐿 	 (3.28) 
Consequently, the demand function for labor service s is obtained from profit 
maximization, but now considering the opportunity cost of financing their 
productive activity with their own funds (perfect competition market): 
𝐹 𝑃 𝐴𝐾 𝐿 𝑊 𝐿 𝑑𝑠 𝑅 𝑃 𝐾 𝑅 𝐷 	 (3.29) 
D  (= 𝑊 𝐿  𝑑𝑠 𝑅 𝑃 𝐾  would represent the amount needed to fund the 
working capital, and 𝑅  the opportunity cost.  
From profit maximization, we obtain the demand function for labor service and the 

























Under wage stickiness, we must obtain the partial and aggregate labor demand 
functions: 
𝐿 1 𝑑 𝑢 𝑁 	 (3.33) 
𝐿 1 𝑑 𝑢 𝑁 	 (3.34) 




𝐿 	 (3.36) 









According to Aghion and Howitt (1992), final goods production function is the 
following: 
Y 𝐿 𝐴 𝑥 𝑑  (3.38)
The demand functions for labor service s and intermediate good i are also obtained 
from profit maximization, but now the profit 𝐹  considers the opportunity cost of 
financing the working capital Dt (= 𝑊 𝐿  𝑑𝑠 𝑃 𝑥  𝑑𝑖 : 
𝐹  𝑃 𝐴 𝐿 𝑥  𝑑𝑖 𝑊 𝐿  𝑑𝑠 𝑃 𝑥  𝑑𝑖  𝑅 𝐷  
We obtain from profit maximization the demand functions for intermediate goods 















Considering that labor supply is not equal to labor demand and integrating 𝐿 to 



















The expression of unemployment rate is obtained from the ratio between the 





Human capital model 
There are an infinite number of retail firms over the continuum i∈	[0,1], which 
repackage the homogeneous intermediate goods and sell them to households.  
They are the borrowers in order to found the acquisition of intermediate goods. 















The equilibrium condition for the credit market will be: 







1 𝛤 𝜔∗ 𝜇𝐺 𝜔∗ 𝑅 𝑅
 
 
Retailers sell their goods to households and set the price according to Taylor 
contracts each interval of I periods: 









This model displays growth by increasing the quality (productivity) of 
intermediate goods. The intermediate producers found their activity of R&D by 
means of credit. 
The average expected profit of producer i in a period t, 𝑉𝐹 , will be: 







1  (3.46) 
We assume the following probability function for the success of the innovation: 
𝜙 𝑛 𝑛 0 𝜒 1 (3.47) 
with 𝜙 𝑛 𝜒𝑛 0 and   𝜙 𝑛 𝜒 𝜒 1 𝑛 0  




𝜙 𝑛 𝑉𝐹∗ (3.48) 
where 𝑛 𝑆 𝐴∗  , 𝑆  being the received credit, equal to the quantity of final 
goods devoted to innovation, and 𝐴∗  the intermediate goods productivity 
achieved if innovation is successful. Consequently, the expected profit of the R&D 
activity that can provide an innovation is: 
𝜙 𝑆 𝐴∗ 𝑉𝐹
∗  - 1 𝑅 𝑆  (3.49) 
The optimal value of 𝑛  will be common for all entrepreneurs, due to the fact that 











1  (3.50) 











1 𝛾 1 1 (3.51) 
 
Human capital model 
The growth process in the human capital model is obtained from the solution to 
the dynamic optimization problem, where the condition 1.81 in Chapter 1 is 
affected by the financial friction and expressions (2.25) y (2.26) are maintained. 
We have, then, the following expressions for economic growth: 





















⎧ 1 𝜉 1 𝑢 1 𝑑 𝑁 𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐹𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
1 𝜉 1 𝑢 1 𝑑 𝑁 1 𝑔 ℎ
1 𝜉 1 𝑢 1 𝑑 𝑁 1 𝑔 ℎ
1 𝜉 1 𝑢 1 𝑑 𝑁 1 𝑔 ℎ 1 𝐽   𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦
 
	
where uss y Nss are steady-state values with wage flexibility, while u1 , h1 and N1 are 
the decisions for labor services with constant nominal wage for s∈ 0, J 2 ,  u01 , 
h01 and N1 for s∈ J 2, J 2 , and u0, h0	 and N0 for s∈ J 1, J 1  those 
corresponding to labor services that will reset the nominal wage in the following 
period. 
Regarding the time devoted to the production activity, we can maintain the 





























    𝑠 0	 (3.55) 
𝑢






𝑠 1	 (3.56) 
	
3.2.3 Unemployment	 and	wage	 stickiness:	 efficiency	wages	 and	
staggered	contracts	
Just as in Chapter 2, the labor market friction is introduced by the existence of 
efficiency wages and we can maintain the same expressions. Sticky efficiency wage, 









4𝑟 𝑎∆ 𝑏∆ 𝑧∆
∆ 4𝑟 𝑏∆ 𝑞∆
𝑞∆ 𝑎∆
4𝑟 𝑎∆ 𝑏∆ ∆ 4𝑟 𝑏∆
	 3.57












We again consider that there are neither public expenditures nor an external 
sector and the demand for final goods is composed of consumption, investment in 
R&D and intermediate goods production. As a result, the ratio 








































Taking into account the leverage ratio ∅  from expression (3.10), we can obtain the 
































The normalization of all the growing variables of the Schumpeterian model is 
carried out dividing them by the production level of the final good, Y.  The system 





, g, L , L , LL, ∆ , w, , N , N, u, ,   ,	R,  R , 𝑣, 𝜂, 𝐺 𝑇 , 
𝐺 𝑆 ,  and ∅.  
Related to the model without financial sector, six endogenous variables are added, 
and correspondingly six equations. 
Human capital model 
We again assume that there are neither public expenditures nor an external 
sector. Therefore, the steady-state consumption to physical capital ratio in steady 











𝑔 𝐶 𝛿	 (3.62) 
𝑔 𝑌 𝑔 𝑌 𝑔 𝐾 𝑔 𝐿 𝑔 𝐶 	 (3.63) 
Finally, as 𝑅  represents the opportunity cost of resorting to external funds, we 
can obtain the following expression for the relation of credit market: 
1 𝑅 1 𝑅 1 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 	 (3.64) 
As in the previous chapters, the normalization of all the growing variables is 
carried out by dividing them by the physical capital level, K. The system of 




, ∆ , g C , 
d, L , L , L , LL, ∆ , w, N , N , N, u , u , u , , R, R and 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚. In this case only 







As in the previous chapters, the two models have been simulated through Dynare 
in order to obtain the endogenous variable values in steady state and their 
responses to changes in trend inflation. In this chapter, we will pay special 
attention to the role played by the financial friction. 
The values of the parameters are presented in Table 3.1. They are appropriate for 
quarterly data and, excluding the specific parameters of efficiency wage (z, q, e 




Table	3.1: The choice of parameter values 
 
3.3.1. Schumpeterian	model	
The behavior of the long-term inflation−growth relationship is very similar to that 
obtained in Chapters 1 and 2. Figure 3.1 shows, as in flexibility or only price 
stickiness, growth rate remains constant whatever the value of the trend inflation 
rate. Similarly, under wage stickiness, we can observe a relationship with an 
Parameter Description Schumpeterian model Human capital model 
𝛿 Capital depreciation rate  0.0115 
𝛼 
Output elasticity with respect to 
capital 
0.332 0.3256 
𝛽 Utility discount factor 0.99 0.98 
𝜀 Elasticity of substitution among retail or intermediate goods  4.8 
𝜎 Elasticity of substitution among labor services 12 10 
𝜈 Relative utility weight of labor 1 1 
I Periods it takes to reset prices 1, 2 1, 2 
J Periods it takes to reset wages 1, 4 1, 4 
 Productivity upgrade after every innovation 1.0125  
𝜒
Elasticity of the probability of 
success in the innovation with 
respect to relative investment 
0.16  
𝜉 Productivity parameter of human 
capital accumulation 
 0.07 
A Constant total factor productivity  0.706 
z 
Utility of leisure time and 
unemployment benefits 
0.5 0.4 
e  Cost of effort 0.03 0.075 
q  Rate of job-finding 0.9 0.9 
b  Rate of loss of employment 0.5 0.6 
  Bankers’ survival rate 0.97  
  Proportion of diverted assets 0.33  
𝜓 Wealth proportion of the new bankers 0.005  




inverted-U shape being maximized for a negative trend inflation of -0.5%. Although 
the chart does not allow the value of trend inflation to be differentiated where 
growth rate is exactly maximized, we can obtain it by observing the value of the 
rest of variables, especially the value of labor demand, since growth rate is 
maximized when labor demand is maximized, at a deflation rate of -0.5%. 
 
 
Figure	3.1:	Long-term inflation-growth relationship under financial friction − Schumpeterian growth model. 
 
As might be expected, a “growth loss” takes place as a consequence of the existence 
of financial frictions, since financial intermediaries represent an additional cost in 
the production process for retail firms, which signifies a shrinking of labor 
demand, L, and hence, of the production, 𝑌, productivity level, A, and economic 
growth, G. Figure 3.2 shows this “growth loss” as a consequence of the financial 
































Figure	3.2:	Growth loss due to financial friction under flexibility and wage stickiness − Schumpeterian growth 
model. 
 
The relationships between trend inflation and unemployment, employment and 
labor force participation rates are shown in the following charts (Figures 3.3, 3.4 
and 3.5, respectively). As in the previous chapter, flexibility rates remain constant 
whatever the value of trend inflation and these rates hardly vary when only price 
stickiness exists (flexibility relationships are represented through blue lines). 








































chapter. Concerning unemployment rate (Figure 3.3), this does not change with 
trend inflation, so we can also confirm Friedman’s revision of the Phillips curve 
under financial frictions. Regarding employment and labor force participation 
rates, these rates do influence the maximization of long-run growth rate with wage 
stickiness since both rates are maximized at exactly the same trend inflation rate 
value that maximizes the long-run growth rate. Consequently, the presence of 
financial frictions does not affect the behavior of the main labor market variables.  
	
Figure	3.3:	Long-term inflation-unemployment rate relationship − Schumpeterian growth model.	
	
	




























































Figure	3.5:	Long-term inflation-labor force participation rate relationship − Schumpeterian growth model.	
 
Additionally, the relationship between trend inflation and leverage ratio is 
outstanding because the latter summarizes the activity of the credit market. 
Parameter ∅ represents the leverage ratio of the economy, that is, the relation 
between total funding necessary to fund product activity of final goods producers 
and the financial intermediaries’ net wealth. Figure 3.6 shows how, under wage 
stickiness, leverage ratio is minimized at exactly the same trend inflation value 
that maximizes economic growth, or in other words, growth rate is maximized for 
the minimum value of ∅ (6.05982145). However, it is independent of trend 
























Figure	3.6:	Long-term inflation-leverage ratio relationship under financial frictions − Schumpeterian growth 
model. 
Finally, we must analyze the relationship between the measure of the financial 
friction and long-term economic growth. As we mentioned previously,  
represents the proportion of possible diverted assets by financial intermediaries 
causing depositors to redeem (1- of their initial assets. Figures 3.7 and 3.8 show 
the negative effect of the financial distortion on the long-term growth rate 
whatever the type of wage (flexible or sticky). That is, the more asymmetric the 
information is, the higher the contraction in the economy. This growth shrinking is 
caused because the more asymmetric the information is, the higher the possibility 
of diverting assets, the higher the financial costs to achieve the compatibility of 
incentives and, then, the lower the employment and labor force participation rates 




























Figure	3.7:	Variations of the main macroeconomic variables to changes in  under flexibility − Schumpeterian 






















































































Figure	3.8:	Variations of the main macroeconomic variables to changes in  under wage stickiness − 
Schumpeterian growth model. 
 
3.3.2. Human	capital	model	
Regarding the Lucas human capital model, we also observe a similar relationship 
between inflation and economic growth to those obtained in Chapters 1 and 2. 
Figure 3.9 shows, on the one hand, how growth rate remains constant, whatever 
the value of trend inflation rate, in flexibility or only price stickiness and, on the 
other hand, a relationship with an inverted U-shape being maximized for null trend 
inflation under wage stickiness. Again, we can obtain the value of trend inflation 
where growth rate is maximized by observing the value of the other variables, 























































































Figure	3.9:	Long-term inflation-growth relationship under financial friction − Human capital model. 
We can expect a “growth loss” as a consequence of the financial friction, since 
financial intermediaries represent an additional cost in the production process for 
retail and intermediate goods firms (opportunity cost in the last case).  
  












































G (I=J=1) with financial friction

















G (I=2, J=4) with financial friction




However, although we can observe this growth loss under flexibility in Figure 3.10, 
financial friction has no impact on long-run growth rate under nominal rigidities. 
This is due to the minimum effect that this type of financial friction has on the 
value of the external finance premium as a consequence of the lack of wage 
revision for some workers. Financial friction is offset by wages stickiness resulting 
in such a small impact that it does not represent any variation on lending costs. 
	
Figure	3.11:	Long-term inflation−unemployment rate relationship − Human capital model. 
 
The relationships between trend inflation and labor market rates are shown in 
Figures 3.11, 3.12 and 3.13. As in the previous model and chapter, flexibility rates 
remain constant whatever the value of trend inflation and these rates do not vary 
when only price stickiness exists (flexibility relationships are represented by a 
blue line).  
	



















d (I=J=1) with financial
friction
d (I=2, J=4) with financial
friction
d (I=J=1) without financial
friction




















LL (I=J=1) with financial
friction
LL (I=J=1) without financial
friction
LL (I=2, J=4) with financial
friction





Regarding wage stickiness, while unemployment rate (Figure 3.11) does not 
change with trend inflation, employment and labor force participation rates do 
influence the maximization of long-run growth rate since both rates are maximized 
at exactly the same trend inflation rate value that maximizes long-run growth rate, 
that is, for null trend inflation. Therefore, as in the previous model, the presence of 
financial frictions does not affect the behavior of the main labor market variables. 
 
Figure	3.13:	Long-term inflation−labor force participation rate relationship − Human capital model. 
 
In contrast to the previous model, Figure 3.14 shows how, under wage stickiness, 
leverage ratio is maximized at exactly the same trend inflation value that 
maximizes economic growth, that is, economic growth maximizes for the 

















N (I=J=1) with financial friction
N (I=2, J=4) with financial friction
N (I=J=1) without financial friction





Figure	3.14:	Long-term inflation-leverage ratio relationship under financial frictions − Human capital model. 
 
Finally, we must analyze the relationship between the measure of the financial 
friction and long-term economic growth. As we mentioned previously, 𝜇 
represents the supervision costs of bankruptcy, that is, the retailers’ power and 
information, in such a way that the financial intermediary’s benefit will be 
1 𝜇 𝜔𝑅 𝑄  if the retailer announces his/her bankruptcy and the lender has to 
monitor. 
Figure 3.15 shows the relationship between the supervision costs and the main 
macroeconomic variables under nominal flexibility, where the greater the 
supervision costs the higher the external finance premium and the higher the 
production cost. Consequently, as the supervision costs are higher, the labor 





























Figure	3.15:	Variations of the main macroeconomic variables to changes in 𝜇: flexible wages − Human capital 
model. 
However, as has already been mentioned, if we consider nominal wage stickiness 
(Figure 3.16), supervision costs has very little impact on the external finance 
premium and it is compensated by the lower effect on real interest, resulting in a 






















































































 Effects	 of	 considering	 financial	 frictions	 on	 maximum	
growth	rate:	transmission	mechanisms	
After having evaluated and compared through simulations the consequences of 
financial market frictions on the long-run relationship between inflation and 
labor market variables and growth, it is necessary to identify from the steady-
state equations (Appendix C2) the main mechanisms that explain these results.  





















































































































0.5164% 86.63% 81.4% 6.0064% 0 2.51086% 98.73% 62.86% 36.33% 0 
Financial 
friction 







0.50505% 86.62% 72.39% 16.422% 0 0.55582% 44.25% 36.31% 17.94% 0 
Financial 
friction 
0.5049% 86.54% 72.32% 16.4216% 6.0598 0.55582% 44.25% 36.31% 17.94% 3.4201 
 Quarterly rates for null trend inflation in human capital model and Π 0.5%  in Schumpeterian model. 
On the one hand, under a Schumpeterian model, we can observe a growth loss as 
a consequence of the introduction of a financial intermediation friction regardless 
of the existence of nominal stickiness or flexibility. 
According to the economic growth rate expression C1.3 in Appendix C.1, this 
decrease is due to a decline in the employment rate as a consequence of the 
increase in production costs (C1.4). Similarly, the LFP rate decreases as a 
consequence of the rise of consumption (C1.10 and C1.11). The net effect on the 
unemployment rate is not clear: we can observe a slight increase in flexibility, 
while it slightly decreases with wage stickiness. The different behavior is due to 




stickiness. Finally, the point where growth rate is maximum, leverage ratio is 
minimized since 𝑣 , the marginal return of an additional unit of investment, is 
minimum (C1.18). 
On the other hand, if we pay attention to the Lucas human capital model results, 
we observe a different behavior in nominal stickiness and flexibility. While we 
can note a very slight contraction under flexibility, the effect of the friction costly	
state	verification	has a null effect on economic variables under nominal stickiness.  
Under flexible wages, supervision costs, 𝜇, minimally increase the external 
finance premium C2.17  raising production costs C2.16  and then, shrinking 
economic growth C2.5 . However, as has already been mentioned, if we consider 
nominal wage stickiness, supervision cost has very little impact on the external 
finance premium, which is offset by the lack of wage revision for some workers, 
resulting in a null impact on long-run economic growth and the rest of the labor 
market variables.  
Finally, regarding the value of trend inflation that maximizes the long-term 
growth rate, the same conclusions found in previous chapters 1 and 2 can be 
maintained in this chapter. According to efficiency wages, sticky nominal wage is 
minimum (and growth rate maximum) when trend inflation is negative and has 
exactly the same absolute value as the growth rate in the Schumpeterian model 
and is null in the Lucas human capital model. Consequently, the previous chapter 
results and conclusions regarding this point can be maintained. Similarly, 
economic growth rate with sticky wages does not reach the value of wage 
flexibility whatever the trend inflation and growth engine. The transmission 






As explained in Chapter 2, the objective of this analysis is to determine the values 
of the efficiency wage parameters consistent with the charts presented in the two 
previous sections and the reasons to discard other alternatives. 
The way to proceed is the same as in Chapter 2: that is, while in the case of 
flexibility the simulations are independent of trend inflation, with wage stickiness 
the simulations are made for the value -0.505%, the optimal trend inflation for the 
combination of parameters z=0.5, e=0.03, q=0.9, b=0.5 in the Schumpeterian 
model, and 0% for the combination z=0.4, e=0.075, q=0.9, b=0.6, in the Lucas 
human capital model. When the sensibility for one of the four parameters is 
studied, the other three are maintained in the values of the combinations of Table 
3.1. 
Similarly to Chapter 2, we can observe more immediate and significant sensibility 
of the flexible real wage to fluctuations in the parameters, except in the case of the 
probability of employment loss (parameter b). The reason is the same as in 
Chapter 2: that is, the crossed influence on this variable originated from the 
probabilities of losing employment (b and q) and from only considering the results 
corresponding to the inflation rate, which maximizes growth.  
Even though the value of the parameters of this chapter is not the same as that in 
Chapter 2, and then, the threshold values are different, we can observe the same 
behavior with both flexible and sticky wages. Consequently, we can confirm that 
financial frictions do not alter the sensibility analysis previously performed and 




3.3, which entail a growth loss (like employment and LFP losses) as consequence 
of the existence of unemployment.  
As in Chapter 2, unemployment rate is acting as an endogenous variable, so this 
analysis cannot cover the isolated effect of unemployment rate variations in 
efficiency wages. However, we can observe an inverse relationship between 
unemployment rate and average real wage, which means that unemployment rate 
does act as a discipline mechanism. 
Figures 3.17 and 3.18, which show the sensitivity analysis for the different 




Figure 3.16 shows the response of growth, employment, LFP and unemployment 
rates in the Schumpeterian model to changes in the parameters z	(Figure 3.17a), e	
(Figure 3.17b), q	(Figure 3.17c) and in b	(Figure 3.17d). In order to perform this 
analysis, we must bear in mind expressions (3.22) for the LFP rate, (3.42 and 3.43) 
for the employment rate, (3.57 and 3.58) for efficiency wages, (3.51) for economic 
growth and (3.10) for leverage ratio. 
Considering wage flexibility, increases in z, the utility of leisure time and 
unemployment benefits, e, the cost of making the working effort, and b,	 the 
probability rate of employment loss, cause an increase in efficiency wages and, 
consequently, a decrease in employment and LFP rates and an increase in leverage 




since increases in efficiency wages cause a decrease in employment rate and, 





































































On the other hand, changes in parameter q, the probability of being caught shirking 
and being fired, cause the opposite effect: a drop in efficiency wages, an increase in 
employment and LFP rates, a decrease in the leverage ratio and, then, a rise in the 





































































Regarding stickiness, the lack of wage revision with the growth rate and the 
crossed effects of the probabilities of keeping employed offset the effect of z, q and 































































Nevertheless, we must highlight the exception of the parameter b, the probability 
of employment loss, as the unemployment and growth rates of stickiness respond 





























































Figure 3.18 shows the response of growth, employment, LFP and unemployment 
rates in the Lucas human capital model to changes in the parameters z	 (Figure 
3.18a), e	 (Figure 3.18b), q	 (Figure 3.18c) and in b	 (Figure 3.18d). In order to 
perform this analysis, we must bear in mind expressions (3.24, 3.25 and 3.26) for 
the LFP rate, (3.33, 3.34, 3.35 and 3.36) for the employment rate, (3.57 and 3.58) 
for efficiency wages and (3.52) for economic growth. 
 
   
  




































































Similarly to the Schumpeterian model, if we consider wage flexibility, increases in 
z, e, and b,	 cause an increase in efficiency wages and, then, a decrease in 
employment and LFP rates, reducing economic growth. The impact on 
unemployment rate also is as expected, since increases in efficiency wages cause a 
decrease in employment and, therefore, an increase in the unemployment rate.  
 
   
 

























































On the other hand, an increase in parameter q causes the opposite effect: a drop in 
efficiency wages, an increase in employment and LFP rates and, then, a rise of the 
growth rate and a decrease in the unemployment rate. 
Regarding stickiness, the effect of z, q and e are barely noticeable, while parameter 
b has a more significant effect on the growth and labor market variables due to the 
effect that △ , △  and △  have on sticky wages. 
 
   
 
	




























































Finally, as in the previous chapter without the financial sector, we must highlight 
the higher effect or sensitivity of the economic variables to fluctuations in 
efficiency wage parameters if we consider wages per unit of human capital instead 
of wage per worker. A variation in one of the parameters involves a much more 
































































Once unemployment and financial frictions have been included in both models, we 
will verify some empirical implications through estimation procedures provided 
by Dynare. In particular, we will estimate their parameters for the economies of 
the United States, Australia, EMU (France, Spain, Germany) and Japan, that is, 
countries governed by different central banks. 
Dynare uses Bayesian estimation procedures, which allows for the estimation of 
the structural parameters of these economies. Once the parameters of the models 
have been estimated for each economy, we can resimulate and compare their 
observed data with their optimal equilibrium. This comparison allows us to 
establish whether the target inflation chosen by central banks would maximize the 
long-run economic growth, employment and LFP rates or whether there would be 
room for improvement by modifying the target rate.  
The observed data have been obtained from OECD.org, which have been 
normalized according to steady-state expressions (Appendix B2 and Appendix C) 
to obtain the main steady-state variables for each model. Moreover, in order to 
avoid stochastic singularity, we must consider at least as many shocks or 
measurement errors as we have observed variables. 
 
3.6.1. Schumpeterian	model	
The estimation of the Schumpeterian model has been carried out taking into 
consideration nominal rigidities, unemployment and financial friction; that is, we 
have used the complete model of this chapter. The following results have been 




LFP, unemployment and employment rates, real wage, consumption, real interest 
rate, long-run economic growth and leverage ratio. We have considered different 
periods of time for each economy, taking into consideration the stationarity 
requirement of the observed data.  
Once the estimation has been completed and all the parameters of each economy 
obtained, we have resimulated the model with these values of the parameters in 
order to obtain the best values of the main macroeconomic variables: growth, 
employment, LFP and leverage ratio. In this way, we will be able to compare the 
real or observed situation with the best simulated results for every economy. 
Table 3.3 summarizes the main findings of the Schumpeterian model’s estimations 
in the first of the two columns displayed for each country. 
Firstly, we obtain a growth loss (1) as a result of not having chosen the optimal 
trend inflation as target (difference 2). We can observe how this growth loss or 
difference is higher for economies with a lower observed growth rate, such as 
Germany, France or Japan. These economies would be those with greater room for 
growth improvement. 
Secondly, we can compare the labor market variables, where simulated values 
have had to be adjusted in order to be comparable with observed values. The 
adjusted value has been obtained by multiplying the best simulated value by the 
ratio between the observed and simulated value corresponding to the observed 





Table	3.3:	Empirical results for Schumpeterian and human capital models 














Quarterly observed growth  0.60%  0.68%  0.79%  0.83%  0.28%  0.39%  0.25%  0.25%  0.67%  0.69%  0.31%  0.32% 
Annual observed growth  2.43%  2.75%  3.20%  3.36%  1.13%  1.58%  0.99%  1.01%  2.69%  2.80%  1.23%  1.30% 
Maximum quarterly growth  0.73%  0.88%  0.81%  1.28%  0.40%  1.04%  0.38%  0.96%  0.69%  0.97%  0.54%  0.98% 
Maximum annual growth  2.94%  3.56%  3.26%  5.21%  1.59%  4.22%  1.59%  3.88%  2.79%  3.94%  2.17%  3.97% 
Difference (1)  0.51%  0.81%  0.07%  1.85%  0.46%  2.64%  0.60%  2.88%  0.10%  1.14%  0.94%  2.68% 
Quarterly observed inflation  0.47%  0.76%  0.68%  0.88%  0.38%  0.36%  ‐0.23%  ‐0.21%  0.76%  0.76%  0.25%  0.27% 
Quarterly objective inflation  ‐0.70%  0.00%  ‐0.80%  0.00%  ‐0.40%  0.00%  ‐0.40%  0.00%  ‐0.60%  0.00%  ‐0.50%  0.00% 
Difference (2)  ‐1.17%  ‐0.76%  ‐1.48%  Q‐0.88%  ‐0.78%  ‐0.36%  ‐0.17%  0.21%  ‐1.36%  ‐0.76%  ‐0.75%  ‐0.27% 
Observed leverage ratio  6.754965947     3.85054  5.36622609     7.850810  4.93022     3.1562217    
Best leverage ratio  6.754937141  3.85052  5.3662158     7.85080995  4.93021     3.1561958    
Observed LFP rate  65.56%  65.60%  64.24%  63.50%  56.24%  56.13%  61.13%  61.21%  55.96%  55.58%  58.46%  58.59% 
Best LFP rate   65.67%  66.60%  64.41%  64.43%  56.28%  56.28%  61.13%  61.27%  56.06%  56.33%  58.50%  58.67% 
Difference (3)  0.11%  0.99%  0.17%  0.93%  0.05%  0.15%  0.00%  0.06%  0.09%  0.75%  0.03%  0.08% 
Observed employment rate  61.62%  61.36%  60.35%  59.07%  51.40%  51.06%  58.46%  58.57%  49.31%  48.69%  53.54%  53.80% 
Best employment rate   61.72%  62.39%  60.50%  60.03%  51.44%  51.21%  58.46%  58.64%  49.38%  49.42%  53.57%  53.88% 
Difference (4)  0.10%  1.04%  0.15%  0.96%  0.04%  0.16%  0.00%  0.06%  0.07%  0.73%  0.03%  0.08% 
                                      
del     0.0289     0.0296     0.0297     0.0296     0.0296     0.0296 
alp  0.4868  0.3624  0.5330  0.3498  0.5492  0.3574  0.5576  0.357  0.4893  0.3549  0.4050  0.3556 
bet  0.9632  0.8396  0.9966  0.84  0.9958  0.8393  0.9802  0.8396  0.9994  0.8401  0.9822  0.8396 
eps     4.7963     4.7979     4.7979     4.798     4.7979     4.7978 
fi     0.8199     0.8746     0.8586     0.8546     0.8464     0.8627 
sig  9.7545  10.8356  9.2820  10.844  9.3208  9.7559  10.4138  9.7533  9.5697  10.8446  10.4849  10.843 
v  1.3809  0.8189  1.4377  0.7766  1.6992  0.7781  0.1120  0.785  0.2580  0.7732  2.7512  0.7647 
A     0.5668     0.6017     0.5673     0.5672     0.5711     0.5675 
gam  1.0223     1.0197     1.0116     1.0063     1.0135     1.0163    
gama  0.9991     0.9835     0.9280     0.9367     0.9642     0.9837    
chi  0.1905     0.1499     0.1860     0.0770     0.1092     0.2012    
land  0.3795     0.1713     0.1132     0.1625     0.2289     0.0220    



























Then, regarding the employment and LFP rates, we also notice small losses or 
differences between observed and best values (differences 3 and 4); nevertheless, 




rates, since observed trend inflation is very close to the best one (difference 2). 
Consequently, although France, Japan and Germany are the analyzed countries that 
have a more significant difference to improve their growth rate, these countries 
have little room for improving their long-run economic growth through the labor 
market. In fact, in the case of Japan, we can note that it is very difficult or even 
impossible to improve the situation of its labor market. 
Finally, regarding the leverage ratio, we also observe a small difference between 




According to sections 3 and 4 of this chapter, if we consider rigid wages, financial 
friction of the type costly	 verification	 does not have any impact on the main 
macroeconomic variables. Consequently, the estimation of the Lucas human capital 
model has been carried out, taking into consideration nominal rigidities and 
unemployment, that is, the model of the previous chapter. The following results 
have been obtained through the Dynare estimation process with seven observed 
variables: LFP, unemployment and employment rates, real wage, consumption, 
real interest and long-run economic growth. The samples considered intervals of 
time periods that guarantee stationarity of the observed data.  
As in the Schumpeterian model, once the estimation has been completed for each 
economy, their models have been resimulated with the estimated parameters in 





Table 3.3 also summarizes the main findings of the Lucas human capital model’s 
estimations in the second of the two columns displayed for each country. 
Similarly to the Schumpeterian model, we observe a growth loss regardless of the 
economy (difference 1) as a result of not having chosen the optimal trend inflation 
as the target rate, which is higher for economies with a lower observed growth 
rate. We can also compare the labor market variables, where simulated values 
have been adjusted in the same way as they were for the Schumpeterian model in 
order to be comparable with observed values. Regarding employment and LFP 
rates, we also notice a loss (differences 3 and 4), which is minimal for economies 
where we observe the lowest growth rates, since the observed trend inflation is 
very close to the best one. 
Consequently, in the countries where we observe a lower growth rate and, then, 
greater room for improvement, it is not possible to boost their economies through 
labor market variables because they are close to the optimum situation of their 
labor market. 
Finally, if we compare the values of common parameters in the models, we can 
note a clear difference in α and β. Parameter α, output	elasticity	to	 intermediate	
goods, is substantially higher for the Schumpeterian model, which is evident since 
this model represents an endogenous growth model based on the quality 
improvement of intermediate goods. With regard to parameter β, intertemporal 
discount	factor, this is considerably lower for the human capital model, which also 
makes sense, since workers devote part of their time to human capital 




On the other hand, if we pay attention to the influence of the financial friction on 
the economies (Schumpeterian model), the higher the financial distortion, that is, 




The models used in Chapter 2 have been enriched in this chapter through the 
incorporation of the financial sector in order to know the effects of financial 
market distortions and to explore the empirical implications for six developed 
countries. The focus is on the long-run relationships of inflation−growth and 
inflation−labor market variables compared to the conclusions of the previous 
chapter and the inflation−leverage relationship. The main results have been 
obtained from simulation and estimation using Dynare. 
Firstly, we can conclude that the introduction of financial frictions does not 
substantially affect the relationship between trend inflation, long-run growth and 
labor market variables in their main features.   
Moreover, in the financial	intermediation	model	(Gertler and Karadi, 2011) we find 
that the trend inflation that minimizes the leverage ratio is the same as  that which 
maximizes long-run economic growth, employment and LFP rates. In this case the 
economy reaches the maximum growth with the minimum level of indebtedness. 
On the contrary, in the costly	verification	model the maximum growth, employment 
and LFP rates are reached with the maximum leverage ratio. The reason for this 
difference is that in the first case the information asymmetry is in favor of financial 




when growth is maximum. In the second, information asymmetry is in favor of 
borrowers, whereby the conditions are imposed by the banks, which do best when 
growth is maximum. 
Nevertheless, although in the case of the Schumpeterian model we find a growth 
loss as a consequence of the introduction of the financial friction (Figure 3.2), we 
cannot sustain the generality of this result because the financial friction introduced 
in the human capital model (costly	verification	model) does not have any impact on 
the main macroeconomic variables analyzed (Figure 3.10). The reason for this 
difference is the low value of the variance of the idiosyncratic shock. Undoubtedly 
there is a threshold from where this effect appears, but in our case this value has 
not been overtaken. 
Finally, our exploration of the empirical implications of the models has been 
performed through Dynare estimation procedures. The conclusions of the 
Schumpeterian model are that the two countries with more potential increase in 
the long-run growth are Japan and Germany. The USA and France are situated at 
an intermediate level of improvement, while Australia and Spain are the two 
countries with the lowest level of growth gain. In the Lucas human capital model, 
France is added to the first group, Australia and Spain would be in the 
intermediate group and the USA in the group with the lowest improvement. 
The way to reach these gains would be a change in the trend inflation (inflation 
target). The single country that should make a positive change in the quarterly 
inflation rate target is Japan (+0.21%), while the rest of the countries should 
decrease the target by at least -0.27% (Germany), -0.36% (France), -0.76% 




in the employment and LFP rates would be around one percentage point, three 
quarters of a percentage point in Spain and almost near zero in Japan, Germany 
and France. So, the growth gain in the first three countries would come from the 
improvement in the LFP rate, while in the case of the last three it would come from 
a change in the allocation that leads them to an increase in the TFP. In other words, 
the growth gain would come from the increase in the TFP in the second group, 
while in the first group the origin would come from the LFP. 
Consequently, although the labor markets of the United States, Australia and Spain 
do show room for improvement, the other three countries show a labor market 
situation near the optimum, with little room for improvement. Finally, it is 
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The wage is the same for all types of labor services. 
The Hamiltonian for this problem is: 
𝐻 𝛽 log 𝐶
1
1 𝜈







𝑑𝑠 𝑅 𝛿 𝐾 𝐶  
𝜆 , 𝜉 1 𝑢 𝑁 ℎ  
subject to (1.5), (1.12), (1.14), (1.17), (1.18), (1.20), (1.21) and (1.22). The first 
first-order conditions are given as follows: 
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The supply of labor is the same for all i and is constant over time. From this 





















𝑔 ℎ 𝑔 𝐶  
The growth rate of human capital is the same as the consumption growth rate and 
the same for all s. We can see that from the accumulation process of human capital 
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where uss is the steady-state value for any s. From this expression we can deduce 






with those expressions the system of equations in steady state is closed. 
Sticky	wages	
Note that the first-order condition for 𝑢  in (A1.3) implies that the real wage at 
time 𝑡 𝜏 has to be the same across all individuals. However, since the nominal 
wage is expressed in terms of effective labor, the re-optimized real wage should be 
constant at the steady state, and therefore the nominal re-optimized wage grows at 
the same rate as the aggregate price. This implies that when the trend inflation is 
different from zero, there will be variations in the real wage across individuals. 
Obviously, this contradicts (A1.3). Then the previous problem is not valid with 
wage rigidity. 
The Hamiltonian for this situation is: 
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As a consequence, there will be two values of N. From A1.12: 
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As a consequence, there will also be three expressions of u	in steady state:  
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The wage is the same for all types of labor services. 
The Hamiltonian for this problem is: 
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The supply of labor is the same for all i and is constant over time. From this 
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The growth rate of human capital is the same as the consumption growth rate and 
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its growth rate is: 
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where uss	is the steady-state value for any s. From this expression we can deduce 









With those expressions the system of equations in steady state is closed. 
	
Sticky	wages	
Note that the first-order condition for 𝑢  in (B1.3) implies that the real wage at 
time 𝑡 𝜏 has to be the same across all individuals. However, since the nominal 
wage is expressed in terms of effective labor, the re-optimized real wage should be 
constant at the steady state, and therefore the nominal re-optimized wage grows at 
the same rate as the aggregate price. This implies that when the trend inflation is 
different from zero, there will be variations in the real wage across individuals. 
Obviously, this contradicts (B1.3). Then the previous problem is not valid with 
wage stickiness. 
The Hamiltonian for this situation is: 
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As a consequence, there will be two values of N. From B1.12: 
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As a consequence, there will also be three expressions of u	in steady state:  
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C.2. Steady‐state	 system	 of	 equations.	 Human	
capital	model	
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